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This thesis studies the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine, a coalition of small-scale
farmers, consumers, and citizens building an alternative food system based on a distributed form
of production, processing, selling, purchasing, and consumption. This distribution occurs at the
municipal level through the enactment of ordinances. Using critical-rhetorical field methods, I
argue that the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine develops a ‘constitutive’ rhetoric that
composes rural society through affective relationships. Advocates engage the industrial food
system to both expose its systemic bias against small-scale farming and construct their own
discourse of belonging. Based upon agrarian values such as interrelatedness, secular grace, and
trust, food sovereignty proposes a vernacular law by which to regulate local food systems.
Advocates perform a ‘grassroots diplomacy’ to gain access to the decision-making process and
to create space for themselves within the existing regulatory structure.
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INTRODUCTION
I have asked myself many times during this project if, as an advocate, it would not be
more effective, more of a contribution to food sovereignty, to analyze the discourse of industrial
food production. Would not such a focus provide a way to show the systematic subordination of
small-scale farming communities in Maine to the hegemony of industrial farming? Perhaps. But
in deciding to focus on and describe the discourse of food sovereignty—and how it constitutes
itself—I think I perform an important shift in thinking about how it relates to the industrial food
system: rather than critiquing the industrialist discourse, I help to compose the discourse of food
sovereignty in Maine. In other words, I do not attempt to show the economic, political, and
cultural deficits of industry—these emerge through my analysis. I do, however, try to show the
surplus, the capacity, the potential of food sovereignty to compose our world along relational
lines.
As Bruno Latour suggests,1 composition offers an alternative to critique that takes
seriously the task of building a world in common with the things around us. I come to this
project with a perspective that sees the industrial food system (and the accompanying mythical
narrative of ‘progress’ through standardization, mechanization, and, above all, commodification)
as already in ruins and in need of re-composition. Food sovereignty, as I see it, works with the
rubble left in its wake, with the “dusty tools of democracy”2 to build places that provide hope for
pluralist democracy and resilience for an uncertain future.
These tools are linguistic and create political definition through their symbolic action.3
One such dusty tool resides in the Maine State Constitution that grants authority to municipalities

Bruno Latour, “An Attempt at a Compositionist’s Manifesto.” New Literary History 41 (2010): 471-490.
Heather Retberg, letter to the editor, Bangor Daily News, March 27, 2017.
3
Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966): 14.
1
2

2

to ensure the welfare of their residents as “a valid exercise of…home rule authority.”4 Since
2011, food sovereignty advocates have exercised this authority by composing and passing
municipal ordinances in towns across the state in response to what they perceive as the
increasing pressure of federal and state regulations on their way of life. Although economic and
directed by industrial agricultural influence, this pressure is also cultural. In the Local Food and
Community Self-Governance Ordinance (LFCSGO), food sovereignty acknowledges that the
integration of “economic, environmental, and social wealth” forms the basis to a stable “rural
way of life.”5 These forms of wealth mutually constitute each other; to isolate or deplete any of
them destabilizes rural communities. The relationships formed between neighbors, friends, and
families—“non-corporate entities”6—grounds this wealth, which grows through the investment
of time and energy into each other.
Throughout this study, I discuss this mutually constitutive wealth as ‘affective relations’
that gain political currency through the embodied set of demands made by food sovereignty.
There are people and places that compose food sovereignty; as a grassroots discourse, it cannot
be imposed through a ‘juridical,’ or administrative, structure. Nor should it be. An article by
Thomas Linzey has significantly influenced this research by directing my attention to the
rhetorical potential and power of constitutions. As the co-founder of the Community
Environmental Legal Defense Fund (CELDF), Linzey works with communities throughout the
United States to build “a new framework of governance in this country” based on rights and
nature rather than property and commerce.7 Characterized as “collective nonviolent civil

§3001. “Ordinance power.” Maine State Constitution, Title 30-A, Subpart 4, 1989.
LFCSGO, 2014.
6
Ibid.
7
Thomas Linzey, “Of Corporations, Law, and Democracy: Claiming the Rights of Communities and Nature,”
Annals of Earth, 24, 1 (2006): 11.
4
5
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disobedience through municipal lawmaking,”8 CELDF’s work—and that of food sovereignty in
Maine—seeks to redefine the public trust as based in people, organized at the town level.
Through analyzing the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine, I recognize this municipal
work as the expression of ‘vernacular values,’9 or the perception of public goods and services as
a “means for ever inventive activities”10 rather than products consumed as an end unto
themselves. Expanding vernacular values requires a renewed and creative relationship to the
tools of democracy so that such expression can gain legitimacy as a source of governing
authority. This study demonstrates how the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine gains such
legitimacy.
In chapter one, I review the relevant literature to food sovereignty. I divide the chapter into
three principal ‘frames’ of thought that form the discourse. First, a review of agrarian philosophy
focuses on interrelatedness between agriculturalists and the landscape and how this relationship
develops rhetorically. Agrarian claims to tradition, ecology, and local control form a base from
which food sovereignty calls for legitimacy within existing structures of governance. Second,
this process of local ‘legitimation’ unfolds in contrast to the increasingly global extent of
agricultural systems. I review literature on ‘international food regimes’ from scholars who have
documented the integration of industrial practices with international policy. This integration
develops an industrial discourse whose ostensible goals of ‘food safety’ and eliminating hunger
come at the expense of variable and adaptive methods of food production and concentrates
capital resources into increasingly fewer corporate players. Third, agricultural globalization
sparks questions of how state power and authority get exercised. I look at a final frame of

8

Ibid, 7.
‘Vernacular values’ here, and throughout the study, refer to Ivan Illich. “Vernacular Values.” Philosophica, 26, 2
(1980): 47-102.
10
Ibid, 52.
9

4

sovereignty to understand how discursive definitions as much as material realities produce
agricultural concentration. The hegemonic discourse of industrial food production defines as
illegitimate small-scale farmers who cannot or wish not to conform to the regulatory structure.
Such definition materializes as state power, exercised on the farms and in the stores in Maine
towns. Recognizing this state power is nothing new; how communities respond to it by drafting
ordinances is.
In chapter two, I review the methods used in this study that consist of an approach known as
critical rhetorical ethnography. As critical research, this study engages in a critique of power
relations. The relations in question have formed between small-scale farming communities on
the one hand and the regulatory system—as informed by industrial interests and enforced by
federal and state governments—on the other. Studying rhetoric draws my attention to the
reflexive capacity of language in how advocates both use and get used by the discourse of food
sovereignty. Ethnography influences the study with its emphasis on thick description and
participatory research. I consider myself a participant and advocate of food sovereignty; as such,
I see my position as a researcher not as an objective perch, but rather as a source of influence on
the discourse of food sovereignty. I interview members of the community as a primary form of
data collection in addition to analyzing additional texts such as testimony and legal documents.
Chapter three analyzes these texts, from which I argue that food sovereignty has developed a
form of ‘grassroots diplomacy’ with transformative potential to compose a new form of
governance. As a primary form of organizing, advocates deploy a ‘constitutive’ rhetoric for the
purposes of identification with one another through variable conceptions of sovereignty,
rejecting political corruption or the appearance of corruption, and through affective relations.

5

Identification enables the construction of a ‘minoritarian’11 discourse through the effective use of
tactical rhetoric. Systemic or structural bias that disadvantages small-scale farmers emerges as a
primary concern for advocates, specifically how this bias obscures their livelihoods as forms of
“subjugated knowledge.”12 I suggest that there arises a tension in ‘the farm’ existing as both a
public and private place, ultimately manifesting as a social entity that straddles these two as a
site of embodied community tradition and values. De-subjugating their knowledge as small-scale
farming communities has proven a transformative process that continues today.
As a result of this process, food sovereignty actively changes the political conditions that
exist in Maine in two ways. Primarily, advocates demand political transparency as it relates to
agricultural regulations by pluralizing access to the decision-making process. Secondarily, this
demand generates support across a wide range of political positions through an equally broad set
of arguments. As laid out in the municipal ordinance, advocates demand economic,
environmental, and social wealth—a combination which appeals to many who might
traditionally oppose one another politically, from fiscal conservatives to environmentalists. The
problems facing our society at this point in time do not have ‘left’ or ‘right’ solutions, but require
collective action for effective decision-making.13 As an example of ongoing grassroots
diplomacy, food sovereignty sets an admirable example for how, as a society, we might compose
our world going forward rather than only critiquing decisions gone wrong. I hope that this
project furthers such composition.

11

Gilles Deleuze and Fèlix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1987.
12
Michel Foucault. “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76. Ed. Mauro Bertani
and Alessandro Fontana. Trans. David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003.
13
I draw off of Elinor Ostrom’s theories of collective action to elaborate how food sovereignty’s political logic and
discursive tactics enable cooperation. See Elinor Ostrom. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
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CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
2016 saw a series of acquisitions and mergers between multinational agrichemical
corporations that restructured the over-100 billion US dollar market in seeds and pesticides—
DuPont merged with Dow; China National Chemical Corporation bought Syngenta; and in the
biggest merger yet at 57 billion US dollars, Bayer purchased Monsanto.14 The consolidations
come in the hopes of cutting costs and maintaining profit margins after three consecutive years
of decreasing prices of commodity crops, but the mixing of pharmaceutical, chemical, and
agricultural firms should give anyone who eats pause. The companies celebrated a future of
“integrated agricultural offerings [and] enhanced solutions for growers”15 while others warned of
massive concentration in the seed and pesticide markets.16 While these mergers may be
exceptionally giant, such restructuring of the globalized industrial food system has unfolded for
decades, affecting not only the agricultural sector but also governance structures at the national
and international levels. The fact that this concentration of wealth and resources occurs in this
moment of neo-populist politics should draw the attention of critical scholars of all disciplines to
gauge the consequences of such a mixture.
This literature review contributes to such a gauge through a critical analysis of the
discursive frames at work within an agrarian resistance discourse in rural Maine. Food

J. Bunge and C. Alessi. “Bayer lands seed giant Monsanto.” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2016; J.F. Peltz.
“Bayer, Monsanto in $57-billion merger; the deal would create a pesticide and seed giant.” Los Angeles Times,
September 15, 2016.
15
“Bayer and Monsanto to Create a Global Leader in Agriculture.” PR Newswire, September 14, 2016.
16
D. Welle. “What the Bayer-Monsanto merger means for food, farmers and the environment.” Daily News Egypt,
September 15, 2016.
14
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sovereignty has emerged as a “transnational agrarian movement”17 since its inception in 1996 as
a grassroots response to a globalized political economy that “crystallize[s] national policies”18
into alignment with capital accumulation.19 As a political discourse, food sovereignty argues for
decentralized forms of government that recognize “the land belongs to those who work it.”20 As
a subject for critical scholarship, it offers much in the way for rhetorical analysis of how
formations of power and knowledge unfold in particular places. Concerns for the materiality of
food sovereignty come to the fore through the emergent paradoxes present in the perspectives of
its three principle frames: agrarianism, food regimes, and sovereignty. The paradoxes discussed
within each frame perform a generative function within the discourse as a whole; grounded in
local political resistance to excessive agricultural regulation, food sovereignty serves as an
example of the “materiality of discourse” found in how “turbulence resists the development of
generalizations.”21 To speak of paradoxes as ‘generative,’ I refer to a fundamental tension, as
Kenneth Burke sees it, between the ‘nonsymbolic motion’ of our experience in life and the
‘symbolic action’ of language to describe experience.22 A discourse of resistance emerges from
the ‘patterns of experience’23 that food sovereignty advocates have as small-scale producers and
consumers within a regulatory landscape biased towards industrial food production. Regulatory
bias serves as a ‘motive,’ or generative force, for food sovereignty’s discourse.

Saturnino Borras Jr., Marc Edelman, and Cristóbal Kay. “Transnational agrarian movements: Origins and Politics,
Campaigns and Impact.” Journal of Agrarian Change, 8, 2-3, (2008): 169-204.
18
Philip McMichael. The Global Restructuring of Agro-Food Systems. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
19
Richard Le Heron. Globalized Agriculture: Political Choice. New York: Pergamon Press, 1993.
20
La Via Campesina. The Right to Produce and Access to Land, 1996.
http://www.acordinternational.org/silo/files/decfoodsov1996.pdf
21
Richard A. Rogers. “Overcoming the Objectification of Nature in Constitutive Theories: Toward a Transhuman,
Materialist Theory of Communication.” Western Journal of Communication, 62, 3 (1998): 244-272.
22
Kenneth Burke, “(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action,” in On Human Nature, Ed. William H. Rueckert and
Angelo Bonadonna (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003): 140.
23
Kenneth Burke. A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969): 44. I use ‘patterns of
experience’ and ‘practices’ interchangeably throughout this study.
17
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The sociopolitical disruption both effected and made possible by the statewide discourse
grows through the practices of small-scale farming communities to which many of the activists
belong. A major element of this literature review follows the conditions that have led to the
emergence of food sovereignty as a legitimate social and political force in Maine. Global in
extent, these conditions trace the incremental integration of policy and macroeconomics since the
end of World War II.24 Additional conditions include the ways in which small-scale farming
communities identify with each other and the socio-ecologically embedded patterns of
experience they hold in common, and how policy does not always share these motives with local
communities. Thus, this paper highlights the paradoxes, or the points of resistance, immanent to
the relations of force exerted by the state through the regulatory apparatus. In line with critical
rhetorical theory, food sovereignty “finds its conditions of existence in those virtual breaks or
structures of excess opened up by practices performed within the already established lines of
making sense that constitute the…social apparatus.”25 Here Biesecker refers to a social apparatus
composed through the everyday interactions that cannot be controlled or defined through an
imposition of power. This relates to my work in how I focus on the ‘vernacular values’26 of food
sovereignty in Maine, or the embedded values that compose the discourse and that, increasingly,
serve as the source of a resistant micropolitics.

See McMichael, Global Restructuring; Le Heron, Globalized Agriculture; Philip McMichael. “Historicizing Food
Sovereignty.” The Journal of Peasant Studies, 41, 6 (2014): 933-957; Madeleine Fairbairn. “Framing Resistance:
International Food Regimes & the Roots of Food Sovereignty.” In Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature
and Community, edited by H. Wittman, A.A. Desmarais, & N. Wiebe, 15-32. Oakland: Food First, 2010.
25
Barbara Biesecker. “Michel Foucault and the Question of Rhetoric.” Philosophy & Rhetoric, 25, 4 (1992): 357.
26
In using this phrase, I am referring to Ivan Illich’s essay called “Vernacular Values,” which argues for a renewal
of that which is “homebred, homemade, derived from the commons, and that a person could protect and defend
though he neither bought nor sold it on the market.” This vernacular reality, he argues, opposes the “commodities
and their shadow,” or the “shadow work” that goes unacknowledged yet is required for the capital-intensive wage
economy to function. See Ivan Illich. “Vernacular Values.” Philosophica, 26 (1980): 47-102.
24
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Tensions between practice and force, knowledge and power, tell this story of food
sovereignty’s resistance against the inertia of the state. Contingent relationships, or relationships
of proximity, constitute this resistance. I choose ‘contingent’ deliberately here to invoke its
etymological sense of touch and its need for close proximity to connect. To be contingent
demands a dependency on someone or something else; uncertainty inheres to contingency as
well as our conditioned ability to respond in a cooperative way. Metaphorically, contingency
embraces the dynamics emphasized by food sovereignty in Maine, where trust and community
bonds form the value relations with which the discourse seeks to supplant the commodified
relation to food that so many communities have. Face-to-face transaction constitutes the
principal form of economic exchange promoted by food sovereignty, the most effective way to
democratically participate and exercise voice in the local food system.27 Food sovereignty offers
a way out of the agrarian crisis of globalized agriculture through an ethic of contingency.
Occurring at the outer limits of state power (in rural Maine), these relationships have also
come to define the limits of the food sovereignty discourse through the institutionalization of
contingent relations in the form of a Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance
(LFCSGO).28 In assuming these formal relations, the neighbors, colleagues, and kin that
comprise small-farming communities in the state have developed a coherent set of obligations
both “subjectively felt and institutionally guaranteed.”29 As a call for the localization of food
systems in order to address systemic power imbalances between states, their citizens, and
agribusiness, this ordinance contests the state’s authority and ability to regulate farming practices

Alliance for Democracy. “Local Rules for Local Food: Communities Hold On To Food, Tradition, and
Democracy.”Justice Rising 6, 3 (2015): 1-21.
28
See Appendix D for a template of this ordinance. Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance
(LFSCGO), 2014. http://localfoodrules.org/ordinance-template/
29
Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education,
ed. John G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 248-249.
27
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at the municipal level. Since 2011, it has acted as a material discursive link connecting disparate
small-scale farming communities in Maine, leading to its passage in eighteen municipalities in
the state as of April 2017.30 Through a grassroots organizing that demands regulations account
for the smallest of producers, food sovereignty not only challenges the rigid regulatory structure
of the state that assumes a ‘one size fits all’ approach to food producers, but changes it in order
to account for the dynamics of place-based food production.
Maine has the conditions to enable such dynamism. It is the only state in the US whose
average farmer age trends downward.31 A younger generation of farmers see Maine as a site of
opportunity, where low land prices and a strong base of local food advocates makes the prospect
of farming less daunting. Food sovereignty seeks to build on this opportunity by also articulating
Maine’s rural farming communities as sites of engagement.32 Engagement here not only refers to
in-situ and contemporary fights against excessive regulation of small-scale farming, but also to
the longer-term project of contesting the subjugation of agrarian knowledges and practices that
are “differential, incapable of unanimity and which derive [their] power solely from the fact [that
they are] different.”33
To realize such a project in Maine, food sovereignty engages with the three frames
mentioned above that enable activists to navigate political boundaries through the cultivation of

This town-by-town approach is a deliberate strategy by food sovereignty in Maine to gain a ‘critical mass’ of
constituents in order to pressure state legislators to recognize food sovereignty at the state level, either in the form of
legislation that changes enforcement of agricultural regulations or in the adoption of food sovereignty language into
the state constitution. For related efforts that have gone through the legislature, see LD 783, 2015; LD 1282, 2013;
LD 475, 2013.
31
See Abigail Curtis. “USDA farming census: Maine has more young farmers, more land in farms.” Bangor Daily
News, February 23, 2014. See also USDA. Census of Agriculture: Maine, 2012.
https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_State_Level/Maine/.
32
Priscilla Claeys. Human Rights and the Food Sovereignty Movement: Reclaiming Control. New York: Routledge,
2015.
33
Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, ed. Mauro Bertani
and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003): 8.
30
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social connections. These connections construct a worldview that encompasses a sensibility for
local food while also extending it to engage with the macropolitical frames that affect
agricultural production.34 While this project employs rhetorical and political theory to analyze
local situations, it also has bearing on environmental communication as a ‘crisis discipline,’
particularly as ‘crisis’ relates to the threat of industrialized food production to traditional ways of
living.35 A piece of evidence invoked by food sovereignty in Maine to this end points to FDA
testimony in an Iowa US District Court case from 2010 that denies citizens “have a fundamental
right to obtain any food they wish.”36 The implication drawn from statements like this by small
farmers in Maine does not parse words, stating that such a position held by the federal
government “will threaten the very existence of our farms, our families, and our rural way of
life.”37 Food sovereignty in Maine and elsewhere has made clear that it not only seeks redress
from the social, economic, and political inequalities that have exacerbated the plight of the smallscale farmer or peasant,38 but also addresses the ecological instability that results from an

Regina Birner and H. Wittmer, “Using Social Capital to Create Political Capital: How Do Local Communities
Gain Political Influence? A Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence from Thailand,” in The Commons in the
New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptations, ed. Nives Dolsak & Elinor Ostrom (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2003): 291-334.
35
For a discussion on environmental communication as a ‘crisis discipline,’ see Robert Cox. “Nature’s ‘Crisis
Disciplines’: Does Environmental Communication Have an Ethical Duty?” Environmental Communication, 1, 1
(2007): 5-20. See also Steve Schwarze. “Environmental Communication as a Discipline of Crisis.” Environmental
Communication, 1, 1 (2007): 87-98.
36
FDA. “Brief in Support of United States’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.” Farm-ToConsumer Legal Defense Fund, et al. v. Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, United States Department of Health and
Human Services, et al., 2010. In this brief, the FDA supported an Iowa District Court ruling to dismiss a case
brought forth by the Farm-to-Consumer Legal Defense Fund challenging the FDA’s ban on interstate distribution of
raw milk. In the brief, the authors claim, “there is no ‘deeply rooted’ historical tradition of unfettered access to foods
of all kinds…To the contrary, society’s long history of food regulation stretches back to the dietary laws of biblical
times.”
37
LFCSGO, 2014.
38
In using the labels of “small-scale farmer” and “peasant,” I am responding to specific preferences for
distinguishing between producers from the US and UK (small-scale farmer), and producers in a similar social,
political, and economic position in Asia (peasant). In Spanish, the term campesinos/as is used; in French, paysan,
paysanne, or petits producteurs. See Claeys 2015. For this review, I will refer to food sovereignty activists as smallscale farmers, and will refer to their allies, when appropriate, as consumers or legislators.
34
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industrialized agriculture based upon external inputs to maintain its level of production.39 It seeks
to improve the resiliency40 of food and social systems to respond to the crises of climate change
and human rights abuses.41
Conceived as a project that contributes to the field of EC, this thesis, in addition to
acknowledging the sense of crisis as a force for change in food sovereignty, attends to the
potential of the discourse to facilitate an environmental democracy, or one in which the notion of
a political community is permeable enough to incorporate nonhumans.42 This shift to a
transhuman perspective is necessary in a world of increasing ecological instability. As several
participants in my study acknowledge, food sovereignty takes just one step towards building
more resilient socio-ecological webs. Such resilience must address the hegemonic ‘juridical,’ or
administrative, framework of law that contributes to the sense that a bureaucratic regulatory
structure privileges uniformity at the expense of equal access to resources, both political and
otherwise. Food sovereignty provides ample space for a reconceptualization of the socio-political
sphere through the generative capacity of paradoxical logic and practice.43 In describing the
events in Maine, this paper also confronts the paradoxical political climate of today, where the

Hugh Campbell, “Breaking New Ground in Food Regime Theory: Corporate Environmentalism, Ecological
Feedbacks and the ‘Food From Somewhere’ Regime?” Agriculture and Human Values, 26 (2009): 309-319.
40
See LFSCGO 2014.
41
Claeys, Reclaiming Control.
42
M.N. Peterson, M.J. Peterson, and T.R. Peterson. “Environmental Communication: Why This Crisis Discipline
Should Facilitate Environmental Democracy.” Environmental Communication, 1, 1 (2007): 74-86.
43
For commentary on the “paradoxical logic” of practice and its informal concerns, see Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic
of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990): 91-95. Bourdieu suggests that by
embracing the logic of practice we make the necessary move from ‘ergon,’ or the performance of a function, to
‘energeia,’ or the actualization of a potentiality. This move, for Bourdieu, happens “on the basis of acquired
equivalences.” Thus, the paradoxical nature of practical logic also resonates with the “equivalential” logic that
undergirds democratic politics as proposed by Chantal Mouffe. In what she terms the “democratic paradox,” Mouffe
claims that there is an “irreducible tension between equality and liberty, between the ethics of human rights and the
political logic which entails the establishment of frontiers with the violence that they imply.” This tension
constitutes the political terrain of democracy and, I claim, is the same tension constituted through the discourse of
food sovereignty. See Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (New York: Verso, 2009): 140.
39
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democratic impulse for equality threatens the liberal impulse for the rule of law.44 Food
sovereignty sustains itself on the democratic ideals of equality and the individual sovereign, but
with the formalizing of the discourse in Maine through ordinances, a “constitutive tension”
emerges between the need for local legitimacy and the need for institutional organization.45
To explore these tensions, I look at three principle frames of food sovereignty,
articulating how these serve as the governing principles that organize perception and
involvement of the discourse in Maine.46 The first frame, agrarianism, acts as the value system
that gives meaning and shape to the small-farming communities where food sovereignty takes
root. Through an ethic of interrelatedness, these values demonstrate an affinity with the concerns
of a “transhuman, materialist rhetoric” regarding “what is nearest,” or the embeddedness of the
human condition with the earth and its myriad forms of life.47 The second frame, the concept of
‘food regimes,’ confronts the historically embedded conditions of food sovereignty. As a
structural critique of macropolitics, it addresses the globalized structuring processes that align
capital accumulation and policy, aptly demonstrated in the agrichemical company mergers in
2016.48 The third frame looks closely at how the concept of sovereignty works in a paradoxical
relationship to both the state and the municipalities. Agrarianism enables small farmers in Maine
to rhetorically constitute behavioral norms that fragment the ‘discourses of discipline’49
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promulgated by state regulatory agencies, but only in response to the ‘state of exception’50 that
the state creates for non-compliant farms.
Norms accrue social capital51 to the discourse and enhance their political purchase as
municipal ordinances, increasing their capacity to negotiate positionality within the state’s
political hierarchy52 using the ordinance as a ‘boundary object.’53 The ‘home rule’ clause in
Maine’s constitution provides the shared legal structure, while interpretive flexibility emerges
through the agrarian frame to generate an ‘organic infrastructure’ that allows farmers and
consumers to adapt to an otherwise inflexible regulatory environment. Star’s description of
boundary objects as ‘n-dimensional’54 resonates with the efforts to conceive of collectives as
blind yet composed through the continual negotiation of cultural habits.55
In closing, I agree with Mouffe that such negotiation needs to be seen as
“contamination,”56 where the liberal discourse of human rights challenges and maintains the
democratic impulse to advocate for equality at the expense of an ‘other.’ To understand how
food sovereignty has used existing legal and cultural structures to grow its political presence in
the state, keeping intact the generative tension between populism and the rule of law, is to
recognize that social habit conditions any articulation of collective becoming. By emphasizing
social habit, I again draw a parallel to Illich’s comparison of the ‘vernacular’ to the industrial.57
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Social habit emerges from the differential capacities that people have to invent and exist in the
environment, whereas the industrial standardizing of habit acts as a normalization of social
needs. Food sovereignty’s discourse acknowledges that needs depend on context; to have needs
imposed from outside one’s environment is to perform the dislocation that underlies the
discursive construction of social division.58 This division depends on the formation of
“contingent articulation[s],”59 or identifications along lines of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ that emerge from
a sense of rootlessness. Food sovereignty attempts to discursively re-root the patterns of
experience of small-scale farming in Maine.
The Agrarian Frame: Interrelatedness
Agrarianism has a rich history in the US, rooted for many in the moralism of Thomas
Jefferson’s writings that stress the capacity for citizens to govern themselves.60 Agrarian rhetoric
has also served as a mythical basis for claims of the moral superiority of farming or rural
living.61 The tradition has additionally claimed a more ‘natural,’ or ecologically-sound,
connection to the earth through agricultural ‘stewardship.’62 In the context of a globalized
industrial food system promoted through government policy, such claims develop into a strategy
of “legitimation” within existing frames of governance.63
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Singer’s analysis provides an example of attempts to rhetorically legitimize alternative
agricultural practice. Through analyzing a documentary film about urban community gardening,
Singer argues how the mythical quality of agrarianism depends on the discursive trope of “an
enduring cultural belief in the morality of farming.”64 An urban immigrant community, in this
case, uses the “malleable discursive frame” of American agrarianism to inspire “place-based
resistance” and democratic participation in a shared “concern for the commons.”65 Similarly,
Beeman and Pritchard trace the rhetorical roots of ‘sustainable’ agriculture to the “soil
jeremiads” of conservationists during the Dust Bowl years of the 1930s.66 The concern for
ecological health drove the rhetoric of ‘permanent agriculture’ and stressed, akin to the strong
moralism of agrarian rhetoric, that this type of agriculture demanded “an ecological worldview
that required reverence for life and respect for nature… [and] the perpetuation of rural culture.”67
Advocates for permanent agriculture actively sought to connect ecological ideals with agrarian
ones, including the idea of “the farmer as guardian of republican virtue.”68
Ecological ideals of environmental holism and agrarian ideals of engaged democratic
citizenship run throughout the literature in complementary ways. Wendell Berry, the leading
figure in contemporary agrarian thought, has detailed such ideals through philosophical essays,
poetry, novels, and literary criticism. Emblematic of this agrarianism is what Berry calls a
“fundamental premise…which is both democratic and ecological: [that] the land is a gift of
immeasurable value.”69 From this premise he draws together an “agrarian standard,” or that the
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principle of “local adaptation” governs the agrarian conscience and community.70 Drawing from
Berry, other authors articulate similar ideas, emphasizing an individual or community’s
proximity to land as providing “an enormously useful set of metaphors for understanding what it
takes to keep society going.”71 Such agrarian metaphors include the farm or field as having a
moral significance,72 “secular grace,”73 and that ‘good farming’74 emerges from recognizing
limits as necessary to counterbalance devastation from a globalized economic system.75
The agrarian emphasis placed on limits or restraint echoes the calls within the field of
environmental communication as well as the common boundary negotiation involved with
rhetorical theory. Peterson, et al.76 build off of Cox’s77 call for environmental communication to
develop ethical commitments by arguing that the discipline can best maintain these commitments
“by repeatedly increasing the permeability of its boundaries.”78 Following Aldo Leopold’s idea
of a ‘land ethic,’ the authors suggest that by destabilizing anthropocentric boundaries to allow
nonhuman actors into a broader ‘land community,’ environmental communication scholars
strengthen “the paradoxical nature of participatory democracy.”79 This paradox consists in the
continuous rhetorical power negotiation between hegemony and dissent,80 in the continual
drawing of a political “frontier between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ those who belong to the ‘demos’ and
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those who are outside it.”81 By “generating and debating multiple legitimate answers to the
question of how to achieve a just and healthy Earth,”82 those with power (humans) must
negotiate with those who have little to none (nonhumans), we must incorporate the earth into the
demos. To do so would embrace the moral imperatives and secular grace advocated for by
agrarianism. For example, such negotiations might produce new material-discursive
arrangements based on a sense of humility, or “dialectical irony,” a recognition of the
“fundamental kinship”83 between those in opposition—in this case, humanity and the earth, or
‘nature.’ Boundaries do not absolutely divide, but overlap and merge in ways that enable
creativity.
Herndl and Brown similarly call for boundary negotiation, although they restrict their
analysis to the human realm. Situated along disciplinary boundaries that span scientific,
regulatory, and literary discourses, environmental rhetoric has “immense” variety, connecting
“almost every part of our social and intellectual life.”84 These boundaries often converge in
politics, with rhetoric offering “a way to help citizens participate in their government.”85
Participatory governance, then, remains a central theme in the construction of environmental
rhetorical theory as well as agrarianism, as Berry has articulated, a theme that enables
environmental communication to effect social change through a destabilizing presence in
contested negotiations. Environmental communication offers much for social activists focusing
on food sovereignty, especially in understanding social change as “successful when groups can
link new values to accepted political positions in a society.”86
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Such rhetorical theory advocates for what Singer calls “place-based empowerment
praxis,” or the social construction of “environmental subjectivities.”87 Empowerment resonates
with the rights-based arguments of food sovereignty that seek to overcome the “double crisis” of
regulation and the marginalization of emancipatory politics.88 Agrarian rhetoric’s place-based
empowerment appeals to a desire for regional “self-determination” through democratic
participation and civic responsibility, intangible community attributes that cannot materialize
through regulatory enforcement.89
Agrarianism as such resembles a set of attitudes, or “loose garment[s],” with the capacity
to change according to need.90 As an orientation, agrarianism maintains flexibility for
communities to identify the inequalities produced by globalization as problems of improper
resource use and a lack of care.91 Rhetorically, such concerns resemble Foucault’s ruminations
on chrēsis, or the concept of ‘proper use,’ which emphasizes the role of practices in the
formation and collective following of morals.92 As a frame, food sovereignty advocates in Maine
deploy agrarianism as a chrestic guide, or a set of value-based practices (both in terms of
agricultural production and consumption), that actively critiques the excesses of modern life93—
foremost of which are the regulations that de-legitimize small-scale farming practices.94
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Such a rhetoric acutely lacks for the growing category of ‘environmental problems,’ for
which agrarianism and conservation biology share a concern.95 With an emphasis on proper land
use and a Leopoldian land ethic, however, the small-scale farm has potential to serve as a
symbolic counterpoint to the globalized industrial food system and to modern industrial society
as a whole. Numerous authors take up this perspective (with its acknowledged parochial
tendencies) and articulate an agrarian values system “embedded in the field.”96 Focusing on the
rhetorical construction of place-based values and ‘environmental subjectivities’ attends to the
sets of practices that constitute agrarian experiences of small-scale farmers.
These practices gain their social legitimacy through the daily interactions between
farmers, the landscape, and consumers. In what follows I review the literature on ‘food regimes,’
which serve as a historical frame to the cultural practices that constitute agrarianism. Antiindustrialism runs throughout agrarian literature, articulated consistently as a perversion of the
economic order, or “the art of household management.”97 In contradiction to values of
accountability, right use, care, and interrelatedness, values in the global and industrial food
system align with whomever has accumulated the greatest reserves of capital. The subversive
quality to the food sovereignty discourse emerges through the inequality in this moral terrain: the
values are fundamentally different between agrarianism and ‘food regimes,’ but in this difference
lies the potential for change.
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The Macropolitical Frame: Food Regimes
Food sovereignty has evolved in response to the globalization of agro-food systems.98
Increasingly integrated systems of regulation and flows of industrial capital99 have developed
into what scholars designate as ‘international food regimes’ (IFRs),100 or global relations of food
production and consumption attached to the accumulation of capital. Global political emphasis
focused on the exchange-value of agricultural products between nation-states subordinates the
use-value of food that relies on the inherent regionalism of agricultural production.101 This
change in value relations leads to agricultural specialization to meet the supply and demand of
global trade. For example, as agricultural consolidation increased in Maine over the course of the
20th century, distinct agricultural regions emerged to produce food for an international market,
including the potato country in Aroostook county, blueberry barrens in Washington county, the
‘milk belt’ in the southern half of the state and poultry (primarily eggs) in the mid-coast
region.102
The international dynamics of trade affects political relations, both between and within
national borders, with the supply and demand of markets acting as a governing force rather than
only an economic one.103 Globalization shapes policy with far-reaching consequences in terms of
socioeconomic inequality,104 ecological stress,105 and political representation.106 An important
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facet of food regime theory for this paper consists in its historicizing of global food systems by
identifying historical junctures that “produce crisis, transformation, and transition.”107 With
increasing awareness of threats posed to humanity by loss of biodiversity and the ‘planet of
slums’108 effect attributed to industrialized food systems, McMichael suggests that the globalized
production of commodity food has reached a “fundamental crisis point.”109
To understand the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine as historically conditioned by
food regimes, I turn to Foucault’s articulation of how the relationships between power, right, and
truth develop and organize in particular ways.110 Food regime theory’s structural perspective
attempts to expose the arbitrary order of how food and farming practices circulate across time
and space, specifically how these orders shift through paradoxical moments in which processes
of capital accumulation and sociopolitical legitimacy diverge.111 These moments encourage
“counter-logics”112 that expose institutionalized dispossession of collective capacities such as
decision making in food production and distribution.113 Food sovereignty in Maine presents one
such counter-logic whose sociopolitical legitimacy develops as a call for alternative value
relations between communities and food. The tension between accumulation and legitimacy
manifests as a shift from institutionalized “regulationism” to value relations in the local food
system, with affective connections (such as trust) between small-scale farmers and consumers
replacing regulatory requirements as a basis for ‘healthy’ or ‘secure’ food systems. 114
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Attending to the contextual relationships of food systems enables a Foucaultian analysis
of food regimes and their relationship to food sovereignty as a local phenomenon as one of
domination that has multiple forms and occurs through “subjects in their reciprocal relations.”115
Understanding the effects of power requires examining its extremities, the “outer limits…where
it becomes capillary…in its most regional forms and institutions, and especially at the points
where [it] transgresses the rules of right.”116 In Maine, the outer limits consist in the small farms,
slaughter sheds, and milking parlors where the state seeks to normalize practices according to
industry standards. These standards, however, do not account for the common “specialty farms”
in Maine, where the micro-dairy farmer milking only one cow or the homesteader who
slaughters less than one thousand chickens per year comes under sanction for non-compliance
with the law.117
Food sovereignty’s counter-logic articulates how this use of state power constitutes an
institutionalized transgression of ‘the rules of right.’ Excessive use of regulatory power on smallscale producers constitutes a process of subjugation, whereby the state designates the
‘knowledges,’ or systems of inherited practices on small-scale farms in Maine, as illegitimate or
disqualified.118 Paradoxical relations of state power emerge at the small farm extremity of the
regulatory system; the act of domination (regulation) occurs at the farm yet the practice of
regulation remains centralized and systematized in the form of the state. Such distant
centralization of power generates the scientific, erudite discourse that Foucault labels as
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‘disciplinary’ and which establishes “a basic link between relations of force and relations of
truth.”119
Food sovereignty’s rhetoric articulates how the state’s discourse of discipline claims both
power and truth, but that this does not make the state right. Thus, advocates emphasize the
dispossession of small-scale farmer rights under a regulatory system influenced by a global food
regime. Focusing on the process of dispossession necessarily focuses on the politics of social
processes at play in food sovereignty, specifically that of the small farm and home as a space of
transition for local and global food systems. This transition could be thought of as moving from
sites of engagement between the state and farmers to ones of governance and decision-making.120
Food sovereignty in Maine performs a double-move with relation to this process, as not
only does the transitioning metaphorically move from disempowerment to empowerment, but
literally back again in the form of municipal ordinances. This double-move constitutes a
resistance to the current de jure to de facto process—where force exerts through law to inform
on-farm practices—and an embrace of a new and different de facto to de jure process—where
the agrarian practices of small-scale farmers inform the drafting of law.121 In performing this
move, food sovereignty advocates invoke the element of ‘right,’ or of their sovereign capacities,
effecting a material and symbolic rhetoric that resists the dominant discourse of scientific and
legal practices that impart legitimacy to industrial agriculture.122
Moving into a discourse of rights that resists a disciplinary discourse of industrialized
food is relatively new ground for any level of juridical schema.123 As a legal norm, many nations
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have adopted the right to food, but little structural change has occurred that would realize the
right as envisioned by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food:
The right to food is the right of every individual, alone or in community with
others, to have physical and economic access at all times to sufficient, adequate
and culturally acceptable food that is produced and consumed sustainably,
preserving access to food for future generations…Thus the normative content of
the right to food can be summarized by reference to the requirements of
availability, accessibility, adequacy and sustainability, all of which must be built
into legal entitlements and secured through accountability mechanisms.124
Food sovereignty is one of the ‘transnational agrarian movements’ invoking rights to fill the
legal gaps left behind by states’ inaction to enact a right to food on a broad and comprehensive
scale.125 The above statement from the UN resonates strongly with that of La Via Campesina
(LVC), an organization comprised of farm workers, peasants, and farm and indigenous peoples’
organizations, whose statement that food is a basic human right includes that “everyone must
have access to safe, nutritious and culturally appropriate food in sufficient quantity and quality to
sustain a healthy life with full human dignity.”126 Coupled with the right to food, LVC also
advocates for agrarian reform, protecting natural resources, reorganizing food trade, ending
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globalized hunger, social peace, and democratic control of agricultural policies.127 Efforts to
institutionalize the right to food and policy based on food sovereignty principles demonstrate the
perceived need for systemic change to food policy. Food sovereignty in Maine weaves into the
municipal ordinances principles from these various discourses and deploys the ordinance as an
attempt to subvert the disciplinary discourse of industrial agriculture as perpetuated in the state.
The groundwork lain by these discourses serves as practical examples of the attempts to expose
the dispossession effected through policies influenced by ‘food regimes,’ policies that associate
capital accumulation with political legitimacy at the cost of small-scale farmers and their
agricultural practices.
In the next section, I discuss how behavioral norms like those in agrarianism,128
constituted through discourse, afford food sovereignty advocates in Maine social capital, which
activists in turn use to gain political capital129 in the passage of municipal ordinances defending
the right to produce and consume foods of their choice.130 The theoretical construction of
sovereignty and its fragmentation within dominant discourses brings attention to the importance
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of positionality for local resistance to the political-economic hegemony of a globalized food
system.
The Sovereign Frame: Political Abandonment
Food sovereignty views farming as a social practice, with its economic impact as a
secondary concern to the development of a just and democratic mode of governance.131 But as a
foundational analytical framework, the concept of ‘food regimes’ offers a structural critique of
the industrial food system as a coordinated devaluation of small-scale farming and agrarian ways
of life. Globalization has profoundly impacted the internal political relations in the US, and food
sovereignty seeks to change these relations at the grassroots level.132
To use this critique in a study of the discourse in Maine, however, focuses attention on
how the globalized industrial food system impacts local food through a ‘discourse of
discipline.’133 Regulatory structure at the federal and state levels in the US exercise the
discursive power of ‘food regimes’ through licensing fees and processing standards that pressure
small-scale farmers to ‘get big or get out.’134 Governments establish the “context of norms”
through regulation,135 but the disciplinary discourse they enforce “define[s] a code of
normalization” that subscribes to an industrialized set of expectations.136
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Normalizing industrial expectations can have destabilizing effects on intra-community
cooperation, as Elinor Ostrom has shown.137 Social norms serve as affective regulatory webs that
community members themselves spin and produce their moderating effects through “shared
understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden.”138 Constituents set the
parameters of ‘cost-benefit’ analyses according to mutually shared values like reciprocity,
fairness, and trust. In other words, endemic or grassroots norms compose a regulatory
environment, rather than an external authority impose behavioral controls.139
In Maine, such imposition of norms means that small-scale farmers cannot meet
regulatory requirements without incurring significant debt or getting locked into modes of
production that contradict efforts to keep the food produced in a community within said
community. In response, local farmers and consumers emphasize the self-regulating quality of a
food system built upon trust rather than systematic inspection that has failed to prevent the
outbreak of food-borne illnesses at the national and international levels.140 It is bad business, so
the logic goes, to sicken your neighbors. If you do, they will let you know when it happens and
the responsible farmer will then enact the necessary changes to their sanitation practices or just
as likely go out of business from the erosion of trust in the safety of their food products.
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That food safety depends on the affective links of community relations as opposed to
legislated regulatory measures offers a possible “perspective of incongruity,” or a novel way to
characterize seemingly disparate events in an attempt to change social behavior141 ‘Food safety
through community trust’ contradicts the disciplinary discourse of regulatory norms and has led
to the grassroots development of the LFCSGO as a means to articulate a resistant conception of
Maine’s local food systems. Food systems developed along lines of trust seek to not only redirect
the flows of capital and financial burden, but also to shorten the distance between consumer and
producer.
Closer proximity, in theory, establishes a stronger sense of accountability on the part of
the farmer and leads to more durable community links in both space and time. These
relationships form the basis of social capital, increasing the availability of and access to potential
material resources (i.e. local raw milk) through the practice of exchange, in the form of money
for food or otherwise.142 These exchanges, as elements of the daily routines of local Maine food
systems, have an explicit goal to change relationships that unfold contingently—or due to close
proximity—to obligatory relationships that last because of their emotional ties between
community members.143 With these affective links rooted in place, institutionalization of the
subversive practices can take effect in the form of the LFCSGO. Articulated in opposition to
international food regimes, these sets of practices constitute an agrarianism through attending to
the “rhetorical force of place.”144
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Food sovereignty’s place-based rhetoric has material consequences that emerge through a
“fluid tension”145 with the symbolic capital invested in the simple yet foundational acts of faceto-face exchanges that occur in the community. In emphasizing the location of these transactions,
food sovereignty adopts the potent symbolism of ‘home’ and the intimacy that it represents. As a
protest, this rhetorical maneuver attempts to effect a disruption within the regulatory system by
positioning the home and its activities under threat from the state. Regulators inspect farms, but
if the farm is also the home and a community center, then the regulatory impact becomes
personally invasive. The home, then, emerges as a place of protest and confrontation, as a ‘site of
engagement,’ and the chosen location in which to open “an ephemeral fissure in place.”146 The
opening of such a fissure does not act only as a form of protest, but also as a form of cultural
inheritance—acts of resistance serve as moments of cultural evolution, the fragmenting of what
appears whole, only to once again enfold the dissent in a heterogeneous process of
acculturation.147
Selecting homes as the site of confrontation does not reflect the preferences of food
sovereignty advocates, but it provides insight as to how the relationship between state regulatory
agencies and small-scale farmers establishes a particular social order of power and rights. When
the small farm and homestead ‘threaten’ this order, a formal displacement occurs, namely that
the non-complying farm becomes a “non-place” in the eyes of the state.148 The subversive
potential of affective food systems emerges from this displacement in the form of a paradox of
power lying at the center of these discourses.
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As discussed earlier, sovereignty moves between subjects as a discourse of rights and
fragments the notion of a unified power into “a multiplicity…[of] capacities, possibilities, [and]
potentials.”149 This “democratization of sovereignty,” however, occurs coincidentally with
systems of law that concentrate force and exercise power between “a right of sovereignty and a
mechanism of discipline.”150 Multiple sovereignties exist among the body politic, but the notion
of an individual sovereign condenses into the state. This idea resembles the notion of a “unity in
diversity”151 that food regime theorists use to describe the global restructuring process of capital
and governance.152
Confrontation between the concentrated sovereignty of the state and the democratized
version dispersed throughout society also generates the dispossession discussed earlier that sites
the farm and home as undergoing a process of transition. Such dispossession or displacement
materializes as a juridical “state of exception,”153 constituting the border between the political
and the legal and as a form of legal “abandonment.”154 This paradox manifests for the small farm
in Maine at farm stands and farmer’s markets, sites that the state exempts from regulation while
still “retaining a ban against unlicensed dairy product sales.”155 The outright ban demonstrates
the legal exception whereby the law applies by designating that to which it does not apply, which
it refuses to regulate.156 Thus the paradoxical generation of a displaced home and a banned
product “defines [the] law’s threshold or limit concept”157 in the state of Maine. As noted earlier
in the macropolitical frame of food regimes, this analysis of the sovereign frame brings food
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sovereignty to the limits of power, to the extremities of the state where power effects are felt and,
in the case of sovereignty, abandoned.
Municipal Ordinance as Boundary Object: Cooperation without Consensus
It is in this state of exception and abandonment that the potential exists for the municipal
ordinance to function as a boundary object; in its position as a boundary object the ordinance has
its greatest liberal-democratic effect. Such potential actualizes in the form of recent legal
decisions that legitimize the food sovereignty discourse in Maine. Taking advantage of a
provision in the state constitution that enables municipalities to adopt, amend, or repeal
ordinances, food sovereignty in Maine invokes “home rule” to presume authority over “the right
to produce, process, sell, purchase, and consume local foods.”158
In a “test case” for the ordinance, the Maine Supreme Court validated the central premise
that exempts producers or processors of local foods from license or inspection so long as “the
transaction is only between the producer or processor and a patron.”159 This stipulation avoids a
situation where the state “pre-empts” the local authority imparted through the passage of an
ordinance.160 Pre-emption enacts the state of exception described by Agamben, where the
legislature “can weaken local lawmaking ability in favor of groups—such as the business
lobby—that may have superior access to and influence over state legislators” through a judicial
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“occupation of the field.”161 Thus, in passing the ordinance and having subsequent judicial
precedent upholding local authority, food sovereignty in Maine legally ‘occupies the fields’ that
the farmers literally grow on and call home. The ordinances serve as a means for a community to
“reclaim control of its local food exchanges” and “to protect a right to foods of [their] own
choosing and [their] traditional foodways.”162
Invoking rights to protect agrarian values attempts to fill the void of power left behind
through the process of de-legitimation for small-farmers at the hands of the state. In the case of
Maine, legal means exist to exempt small-scale farmers from the industrial impulse of the state
regulatory structure informed by global food regime values and interests. As purveyor of those
means, the ordinance satisfies a vital information need for small farmers by identifying the
constitutionally-sanctioned authority given to municipalities and how to deploy this power to
negotiate a farming community’s political status. While focusing on the ordinance as a boundary
object enables a certain tangibility to this conceptualization, I stress that the ordinance also
performs its boundary work as a condensation of “a set of work arrangements that are at once
material and processual.”163 As such, the concept of boundary objects and boundary work is
consistent with Foucaultian notions of discourse. In particular, this concept can help guide the
analysis of subject formation—such as what it means to be a small-scale farmer in Maine—
shaped in relation to things like the food sovereignty ordinance as an object that circulates within
this context.
These arrangements consist of the agrarian practices, attitudes, and motives discussed
throughout this thesis, but give materiality to the ordinance as a boundary object in the daily

161

Ibid, 1156.
Alliance for Democracy. “Local Rules for Local Food.” Justice Rising, 6, 3 (2015): 18.
163
Star, “Boundary Object,” 604.
162

34

activity and rhythms of the small-farming communities that have passed it. Significantly, these
practices occur on farms, in farm stands, and markets that double as boundaries that, as seen
through the legal history in Maine, exist as “shared space[s], where exactly that sense of here and
there are confounded.”164 In this sense, the ordinances as constituting protective zones along
socio-political boundaries are “n-dimensional,” or temporal, active, and open to interpretation at
the local level in order to fill the power void left through the regulatory state of exception.165
Elaborating on the material-discursive constitution of the ordinance-as-boundary object,
these documents have the capacity to function as concurrent archives to the agrarian values they
seek to protect. Informed by “stories from the field,”166 the interpretive flexibility of the
ordinances from town to town enables local processes of social and political legitimation to
unfold within the larger state political landscape concerning “how people imagine they know
what they know and what institutions validate that knowledge.”167 A central component to the
legitimacy of small-scale farming in Maine in the face of industrial regulatory measures,168 the
ordinance helps further contest the “subjugated knowledges” delegitimized through the dominant
discourse of regulatory norms.169
As a document that begins a process of institutionalizing the agrarian values present in
the food sovereignty discourse in Maine, the ordinance navigates the boundary between
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“codified and tacit knowledges,” or the terrain in which a “politics of knowledge” plays out.170
The “organic infrastructure”171 of boundary objects allow for the type of local permutation and
adaptation that agrarianism seeks to maintain.172 This adaptability receives further purchase
through the shared space of policy and agrarian knowledge in which it resides. Potential for local
food systems to take root and grow relies on shared knowledge spaces173 rather than laws of
abandonment because of the implicit accommodation for “embedded social relations…which
facilitate the development of trust between actors.”174
Affective relations like trust play a pivotal role in food sovereignty’s discursive potential,
especially as it relates to the decision-making process at local levels, facilitated by the municipal
ordinance. For example, in discussing what makes public decision-making processes effective,
Senecah concludes that “it all leads to trust.”175 This emphasis resonates strongly with what food
sovereignty identifies as missing in industrialized food systems. Focusing on the face-to-face
exchange between farmer and customer, the trust needed for such a transaction to succeed serves
as a built-in regulatory process. External regulation disrupts the potential for such
neighborliness—as the cost of regulation encourages a larger scale of food production, the level
of intimacy diminishes between not only the farmer and customer, but between the farmer and
their fields as well. The focus on trust as a key element to any public points to the importance of
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developing “patterns of practice” through which any given public can resolve issues in
dispute.176
Ostrom emphasizes how such patterns of practice lead to stable community institutions
that do not depend on outside regulation for their stability.177 To connect with food sovereignty
in Maine, I focus on how these practices depend on systems of social obligation to effectively
self-regulate. Ostrom stresses how “the appropriators themselves make all major decisions”
about the use of a commonly held resource.178 Self-governance occurs through regulation
structured by users or owners themselves. Ownership and governance are closely linked in these
systems of long-term resource management. In these contexts, community members tailor their
decision-making “to the specific environment,” taking into account the dynamic conditions in
which they find themselves.179
Such conditions extend beyond the physical limitations of the immediate landscape;
collective rules are maintained through systems of social obligation, or “locally designed rule
systems.”180 Infractions are met with fines in the form of donations to social institutions or of
goods to the community for their collective use. Whatever the discipline, the lesson remains that
regulation emerges from within the community itself through structures of social obligation.
Such structures allow for change over time to meet the demands of current conditions—
institutional rules are not fixed.181 Attempts to impose uniformity and obeisance from outside the
community can undermine the established norms of behavior that depend on intangible qualities
cultivated over long periods, such as trust.
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As an intangible quality, trust builds social capital182 within the community as a form of
“radical investment”183 in affective relations. Subjects form through affect, or the embodiment of
a pattern of experience. By sharing in these practices, identification occurs along the
“equivalential logic”184 of affect—as trust grows between growers and their neighbors, they
come to collectively identify as small-farming communities. As is shown in the analysis chapter,
both producers and consumers play a role in organizing and practicing food sovereignty. Burke’s
comments on ‘alienation’185 bring the affective modes of identification and social capital into
stark relief, as I believe that, at its base, food sovereignty is an alienated discourse.
Alienation, for Burke, designates conditions in which one loses a sense of ownership or
control over their world because “it seems basically unreasonable.”186 Authority, and those who
possess it, have ‘lost touch’ with those they authorize. Power becomes less contingent and more
distant; uniformity becomes an end that justifies invasive force. In Maine, this takes the form of
regulatory pressure to comply with expensive facilities requirements that simply do not make
sense for many small-scale growers. In response, the discourse of food sovereignty addresses the
immediate, sensual, and affective relations that compose everyday living.187
Advocates of food sovereignty in Maine demand that the regulatory system change to, for
example, accommodate the “rights of appropriators to devise [their] own institutions.”188 Small-
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scale growers who cannot meet the expense of licensing fees intended for much larger farming
operations do not have recourse to a more appropriately scaled system of monitoring, or one that
keeps pace with the smallest-scale of farming.189 Such a system accounts for local networks of
customers that value trust as much as the approval of USDA safety protocols. Such a system
develops what Ostrom terms “contingent strategies”190 that do not require absolute compliance
from all producers – for that eliminates those who cannot meet the standards of production. Such
a system remains “incomplete” in the sense that it cannot account for the diversity of
producers.191 Food sovereignty in Maine directly addresses such a system and advocates for one
that resembles a “nested enterprise” regulatory structure, where different rules address the
conditions present at different levels of food production.192 Small-scale farmers in Maine already
self-regulate through a system of social obligation as it relates to raw milk, meat processed onfarm, and informal bartering of goods and services. They want the state of Maine to recognize
such a system of self-governance and to legitimize their efforts in doing so. As noted earlier, the
Maine Supreme Court has basically recognized the validity of the ordinance.
Trust is central to the social obligations that food sovereignty argues form the basis of
any healthy local food system. It is trust that builds in the self-regulation that ensures the safety
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of local food products and accounts for “the moment of decision that characterizes the field of
politics.”193 Through advocating for the embedded form of politics that the local food ordinance
symbolizes, food sovereignty contributes to a “democracy of the emotions.”194 In this, different
value systems at play in the world—for example, those of industrialized food regimes and
agrarianism—are not synthesized into a homogeneous political mixture, but rather in their
tension with one another create the “space in which…confrontation is kept open, power relations
are always being put into question and no victory can be final.”195
The concept of boundary object provides a heuristic for the municipal ordinance in its
applicability to “cooperative work in the absence of consensus.”196 It is helpful to consider how
consensus allies itself with the homogeneity of the regulatory impulse, with the exercise of
power and its extension through time and space. One of the most potent possibilities of food
sovereignty in Maine lies in the concept’s navigability between political perspectives and
physical communities. The hegemonic nature of consensus implies violence, or a struggle
without any resistance, “an agonism without antagonism.”197
Through its emphasis on and cultivation of affective dimensions in local politics, the
local food ordinance in Maine offers promise as a tool for navigating both the contentious
political landscape of today as well as the paths opening up in the future. These paths will surely
have antagonisms regarding the inflexibilities of globalized food regimes and their enforcement
via federal and state governments. But such antagonisms actually constitute the ‘democratic
paradox’ and its “irreducible tension between equality and liberty,” between democratic identity
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and the rule of law.198 In Maine, displacement through regulatory enforcement gives way to
replacement through municipal ordinance, but the agrarian and industrialist values at play will
continue to contest the farm as a ‘non-place,’ a site of engagement, and as a site where decisions
take place.
Conclusion: Collaborations
In following the tensions within food sovereignty, the relationship between power and
knowledge in small-farming communities in Maine is at its most ambiguous on homesteads and
farms. Here, enforcement and subversion of regulations occurs through a struggle between
different sets of practices, each of which functions as a set of “meticulous procedures that impose
rights and obligations.”199 Both of these sets have discourses with material consequences. The
dominant discourse of regulation has the effect of homogenizing farming practices to meet
standards set by an agricultural industry that has seen massive consolidations in 2016. The
subversive discourse of food sovereignty emerges through small-scale farming practices that
emerge from the “traditional foodways” of rural Maine yet face de-legitimation because of
regulatory norms.200 Despite this, the discourse seeks legitimacy through municipal ordinances
that institutionalize agrarian values on a town-by-town basis. The viral nature of this discourse
throughout the state resonates with Mouffe’s suggestion that liberal discourses of rights and the
exclusive implications of a democratic ‘us’ need to continuously and mutually ‘contaminate’ one
another.201 Neither the law nor the demos should ever become ‘pure.’
This chapter has discussed how the frames of agrarianism, food regimes, and sovereignty
all contribute to this struggle between power and knowledge at macro and micro scales. Each
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frame contains paradoxes that demand decision-making. Solutions are not an option, but rather
choices as to how to respond and how to articulate the collective, whether that collective is a
town, a network of towns, a state, or larger. The articulation occurs regardless of one’s
conviction; what is needed is to understand where it comes from, what habits (not essences)
condition its emergence, and what is excluded from any articulation.202 In this sense, the
conglomerate mergers described at the outset of this chapter do not speak for all of us. Rather,
the forms assumed through the globalization of capital accumulation and regulatory governance
necessarily exclude the small-scale, inherently regional agrarian practices that condition the daily
lives of countless communities across the world. Food sovereignty attends to these communities.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY

The focus of this study is to analyze the discourse of ‘food sovereignty’ in Maine.
Specifically, I am interested in the ways that advocates of food sovereignty in Maine have
constructed a discourse by rhetorically disrupting the dominant agricultural discourse of
industrial food production. In this chapter, I share my methodology for this research, which
draws from rhetorical ethnographic approaches and uses interpretive and critical methods to
analyze interview transcripts, legislative hearing testimonies, and legal documents, informed by
the work of Aaron Hess,203 Michael Middleton, Danielle Endres, Samantha Senda-Cook,204 and
D. Soyini Madison.205 It also draws from the qualitative research methods of Thomas Lindlof
and Bryan Taylor206 and the ethnographic methodology of Clifford Geertz.207 Michel Foucault’s
theories on the genealogy of discourse208 have proven instrumental in shaping how I approach
this work. Together, these theories about critical-rhetorical ethnography guide the specific
conduct of my research. In this chapter, I elaborate on these theoretical and then describe the
specific methods used to gather information and produce insights about the discourse of food
sovereignty. First, I define the framework that guides my research. Second, I reflect on my
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position as a practitioner of both qualitative communication research and farming. My personal
identity as a farmer provides the motive for this study and has fundamentally shaped the ways I
engage with the research. Third, I discuss how rhetoric guides the types of questions that I ask as
a researcher. Fourth, I describe the ethnographic attention paid to context and thick description as
integral to my methodology. Fifth, I discuss the critic’s role in discourse analysis.
Critical-Rhetorical Ethnographic Praxis
Broadly, I conduct rhetorical field research that combines theory with practice to examine
the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine. In line with core commitments within rhetorical field
methods, I examine the local rhetoric of food sovereignty as an act of resistance against
macroscale socio-economic and ecological realities. Advocating for food sovereignty as a form
of resistance aligns with a methodology that combines theory with practice. This combination
expects critical engagement with how theorists conceive of power relations.209 As praxis, these
rhetorical field methods occur in situ, where I position myself as a participant in the events that
generate food sovereignty rhetoric.210
Rhetorical Field Methods
The fluid and embodied qualities of rhetoric attune me to emergent aspects of how food
sovereignty advocates create meaning. An ethnographic approach directs my attention towards
the contextual influences shaping the advocacy and guides my analysis through the method of
thick description. Critical theory enables thick description in its provision of “a vocabulary in
which what symbolic action has to say about itself…can be expressed.”211 As a critical scholar, I
acknowledge my positionality and advocacy as vital components to the study. Without this
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awareness and intent, I could not answer the question of “what do I do know?”212 My open
support for food sovereignty with my participants provides an ethical motive to this study. It has
repeatedly led me to ask the questions: how can I both honestly represent food sovereignty and
honor the community and what they do? How can I embrace yet describe their differences?
Honoring these differences means I attend to ways in which state power limits and
prevents their ability to live agrarian lifestyles characteristic of rural Maine. For guidance, I have
repeatedly referred to the work of Phaedra Pezzullo that studies communities adversely affected
by industry in Louisiana.213 Pezzullo, when discussing the toxic tour of Louisiana she
participated in, includes scholarship on community, notably that of James Baldwin. After
quoting his insight that community sustains historically marginalized groups, Pezzullo ascribes
this way of surviving “to a sense of interconnectedness among those who feel endangered or
threatened by dominant culture.”214 In this passage she posits that the strength of ‘intoxicated’
communities lies in the recognition and cultivation of their difference from the hegemonic
culture that has turned their home into a carcinogenic environment. This recognition of strength
in difference reflects Pezzullo’s understanding of the cultural context in which these
communities live. She sorts out the “structures of signification” that Geertz claims as integral to
the analytical ethnographer.215 Structures of signification stand in as structures of differentiation
between the vulnerable community and those who live outside of it. In highlighting this
difference, Pezzulo attempts to understand their culture “without reducing their particularity.”216
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Lindlof and Taylor’s chapters on producing data and its subsequent analysis and
interpretation further underscores the centrality of difference to the ethnographic process. They
also, as Geertz does, emphasize the need to recognize the “particular cultural setting” of any
ethnographic research.217 Awareness of difference not only helps identify the significant patterns
of behavior within a studied group, but also clarifies one’s role as a participant observer. As a
method of interpretation, ‘crystallization’ embraces difference and fluidity in its attention to
context.218 People’s behavior and a community’s being continuously shifts depending on the
people, places, and things that comprise any given moment.
As the primary form of data collection, I conduct interviews. For my study, I interview
key participants, including local farmers who lead the advocates of food sovereignty; state
legislators who have proposed bills to incorporate rights-based language on food sovereignty into
the Maine constitution; as well as citizens who advocate for the goals of food sovereignty. In
total, I conducted thirteen interviews of twelve different advocates of food sovereignty. I
received IRB approval to conduct the interviews, and followed a semi-structured format when
performing the interviews.219 In doing so, I followed Seidman’s advice in using open-ended
questions, from which I aim to “build upon and explore [the] participants’ responses to those
questions.”220 Post-interview, I transcribed the audio and analyzed the content for thematic
overlap. Once I identified the major themes in each interview, I made connections across
interviews between related themes.
I also thematically analyzed the testimony for seven different bills that had public
hearings in front of the Agriculture, Conservation, and Forestry committee on issues relating to
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food sovereignty. Similarly to the interview analysis, I identified related themes and arguments
across testimonies. Together, the analyses of the interviews and testimony yield seven distinct
themes that I consider a representative condensation of the ideas and arguments at play in food
sovereignty’s discourse. Within each theme, I have selected representative quotes from the
interviews that I feel act as a further condensation of the aspect in question.
Additionally, I read extensively through academic, journalistic, and legal writings
relating to food sovereignty and incorporate their perspectives and findings into my analysis
when appropriate. In the literature review, I contrast many of these perspectives as constitutive of
three distinct frames, or conceptual objects that circulate within and give shape to the discourse
of food sovereignty: agrarianism, macropolitics or ‘food regimes,’ and sovereignty. Frame
analysis of relevant literature follows Erving Goffman’s conception of frames as objects that
organize perception and modes of involvement within discursive communities.221 I use this
method to clarify what I see as disparate, yet interwoven, concerns present in food sovereignty as
a “transnational agrarian resistance” so that, through my analysis, I show how they manifest in
Maine. Within the analysis chapter, I refer to these writings when appropriate, often for
clarification or to expand on an interviewee statement in the footnotes.
I cannot omit how my identity as a small-scale farmer affects my analysis. My
experiences managing farms of various scales, production methods, and specialties
fundamentally shape how I approach this project as an advocate. While commercially growing
produce in 2012 for a small community in New Hampshire, I was one of many farmers who had
to understand the proposals for new regulations in the Food Safety and Modernization Act
(FSMA) and how they might affect my livelihood. Throughout the season, we stocked a small
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farmstand with freshly picked fruits and vegetables. We also retailed food products from
neighboring farms, such as honey, maple syrup, and frozen, USDA-inspected meat. These food
products, under FSMA, would have transformed the farm’s designation from ‘farm’ to an official
‘food distributor,’ and placed it within a different regulatory category that would have
necessitated upgrading the facility. Such a change would have altered the character of the farm.
This experience is emblematic of the motives drawing me to study the discourse of food
sovereignty. The regulatory categories are not the primary concern, but rather the cultural
transformations that occur as a result of industrial pressure. To comply, for many, is to
compromise their way of life. The ‘grassroots diplomacy’ of food sovereignty in Maine enables
cultural and agricultural difference to continue, to the benefit of all.
Rhetoric
This study focuses on how the ‘constitutive’ rhetoric of advocates of food sovereignty in
Maine guides the formation of their discourse. Focusing on rhetoric means that I am concerned
with “how symbolic practices articulate disparate identities, ideas, values, beliefs, images,
meanings, bodies, and communities”222 that, in turn, shape the very communities from which
these practices emerge. This reflexivity of rhetoric makes for a “messy multimodality”223 that is
difficult to define in a total sense, but does compel the researcher to work within a community to
understand and follow the nuances of rhetorical composition. Attending to one’s own
positionality and rhetorical influence contributes to the participatory nature of this research and I
will discuss it in more detail below.
A central assumption to my study is that the texts I analyze are socially embedded. The
interview transcripts and various legal documents all gain meaning from the “embodied
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participation in emplaced rhetoric”224 by myself and advocates of food sovereignty.
Embeddedness of rhetoric means that it is both a part of any community and present in all its
happenings. Rhetoric is partial yet ubiquitous and also highly partisan, that is, always culturally
mediated. As a means of producing ideology and identity, rhetoric acts in “ordinary and taken for
granted”225 ways, often subliminally experienced by members of any community while obvious
to outsiders. Conceiving of texts as interwoven with the social practices and contexts that create
them opens their interpretive possibilities, making them both fluid and embodied.
Given the complexity and interconnections that shape food sovereignty discourse, my
methodology requires commitments to fluidity and embodiment in order to sense patterns and
follow the tangled threads of how patterns connect. Two rhetorical concepts in particular help me
develop these commitments, namely: kairos and phronesis.226 Kairos speaks to the timing or
sense of seizing rhetorical opportunities when they arise. It pushes the creative boundaries of
research, encouraging the scholar to adjust to emergent situations both in the field and in the
analytical process. Kairos leads one to attend to rhetorical flux, necessarily drawing the
researcher closer to the subjects of their study.
Phronesis demands sound judgment or understanding on the part of the researcher. As it
relates to my study and critical-rhetorical study in general, phronetic research engages with “the
micropractices and micropolitics of power."227 For example, the ‘constitutive’ rhetoric of food
sovereignty directly addresses questions of authority and power because of how advocates
perceive their livelihoods as threatened by power imbalances perpetuated through existing
governance structures. Such a concern implicates the capacity of rhetoric to form identity and
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ideology, as advocates’ sense of self is at risk. Phronesis, in this example, directs my attention to
how the effects of governmental power “pass not just between distinct subjects but through the
individual person,”228 deeply impressing the discourse of food sovereignty with a rhetoric of
resistance. Kairos aids me in the interviewing process to understand when and how I should ask
questions or allow the interviewee to expand on a thought in order to gain “access to the context
of people’s behavior,”229 or the nuanced power relationships at work in food sovereignty’s
discourse.
The inventiveness of food sovereignty’s rhetoric has become clearer the closer or more
embedded I have become in the discourse—as I have developed a more ‘contingent’
understanding of it. This relationship grows as the interpretive process unfolds in relation to the
words, thoughts, and actions of the participants; both parties co-create the research process and
bring to it myriad contingencies that must be accounted for when trying to make sense of the
data.
Understanding these contingencies begins by acknowledging and respecting the
expression of experience offered by the participants, recognizing that “each word a participant
speaks reflects his or her consciousness… [their] thoughts become embodied in their words.”230
Embodiment of experience and expression contributes to the researcher’s interpretation of a topic
and undoubtedly affects the research conclusions. Lindlof and Taylor make a similar claim when
they address the approach of ‘crystallization’ to qualitative research. In lieu of any sort of
‘objectivity’ capturing reality, they recognize that “qualitative methods are all shaped by a
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researcher’s partial, contingent, embodied, and historically situated experience with a group or
culture.”231 Context shapes interpretation and prevents a tone-deaf interpretation of phenomena
that emerge in response to socially-constructed environments.
Emergent phenomena present challenges to researchers as well in that, by acknowledging
such phenomena, “the researcher must… [have] an open attitude” and seek emergent data as they
interpret.232 Sensitivity to context leads the authors of both readings to make claims as to the type
of thinking needed to reduce the data into a final product. Seidman advocates for inductive,
rather than deductive, thinking. Lindlof and Taylor, though, introduce a third mode of thought in
abduction, of which they state that “the work of interpretation is mainly characterized”.233
Abduction, in their terms, corresponds to a sensitivity towards emergence in that the abductive
process “creates a new principle from established facts” rather than inferring from instances, as
with induction.234
Regardless of terminology, the emphasis remains clear: an awareness of context allows
for recognition of emergent phenomena as they occur. This approach to interpretation sustains
creativity and promotes, as Lindlof and Taylor suggest, “the purposeful blending of artistic and
scientific sensibilities for studying the complexities of human experience.”235
Ethnographic Methodologies
As a researcher, awareness of the context within which rhetoric occurs is a way to
conceive of my research as “in situ rhetorical analysis.”236 Emplaced research allows for
engagement with marginalized communities and voices that might not otherwise be heard within
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the “disciplinary”237 discourse of industrial food production. This emphasis on place draws
heavily for its methodology from ethnography, especially the need for researchers to be ‘present’
with their participants.
Taking presence into account, Conquergood warns against the “temporal reification of
other cultures” that can occur in the course of ethnographic research.238 Rather than perpetuating
the intercultural “closure…constituted by the gaze” of the detached researcher, he advocates for
listening, an “interiorizing experience” that privileges conversation over observation.239
Conquergood uses a critical stance to “[unveil] the political stakes that anchor cultural
practices.”240 In this case, he focuses on the cultural practices of ethnographic researchers.
Similarly, Madison calls for ethnographers to move away from just being ‘present’ to
having ‘presence’ with “the Other” through dialogue.241 Her discussion of the “ethnographic
present” draws attention to the (mis)representation of ‘timeless’ cultures, thus extending the
myths of a ‘developed’ vs. ‘undeveloped’ world and further entrenching binary logic. Like
Conquergood’s claims about conversation, she claims that through “dialogue and meeting with
the Other,” one can be more fully themselves, that researchers can understand and know their
place in the complicated relationships with research participants.242
Presence and a dialogical mode of inquiry allows the researcher to describe the “flows of
behavior”243 that form the current of cultural articulation. By engaging with the context of
discourse, the analytical process is one of ‘thick description’ that addresses the value of
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particular modes of public expression. Any general claim “grows out of the delicacy of its
distinctions, not the sweep of its abstractions.”244 Throughout my analysis, I use thick description
of the context and language of food sovereignty advocates to gain a deeper understanding of “the
role of culture,”245 or to understand what their symbolic action has to say about itself.
The agrarian values and affective connections that constitute food sovereignty’s discourse
serve as the things they seek to sustain, that they hold in common with each other as a means of
identification and a source of power. These forms are their “culture’s substance,”246 the basis
from which they develop public life and political presence at the state level. To trace this
substance throughout my analysis, I have had to cultivate an awareness of their context through
presence, dialogue, and a kairotic attention to how state power affects their daily lives.
Situating the Critic in the Field
As a critical researcher, I see myself as “an inventor of discourses” – similarly to the
participants in my study – and thus “engaged in a constant critique of power.”247 Questioning the
exercise of power, as demonstrated through my analysis, leads me to “advocate on behalf of the
vernacular”248 of food sovereignty, or to use the language that is used within the community.
This ability stems from my own participation in small-scale farming outside of my capacity as a
researcher, yet still shapes how my participation through this study develops in self-reflexive
ways. This “rhetorical reflexivity”249 attends to my participant observation of the food
sovereignty discourse, a role that is constantly “negotiated and performed” along lines of
“informed reciprocity.”250
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These lines act as boundaries between myself and the participants and my roles as
observer and participant. Throughout this study, I am more of a “participant-as-observer”251 than
an observer-as-participant, meaning that I inform the participants of my advocacy for food
sovereignty. As a result, I have more flexibility to negotiate my positionality during and after
interviews and have contributed to the efforts of the community in a public way. Regardless,
such a position still entails sensitivity to boundaries between academia and the broader public,
specifically the embodied construction of boundaries that then shape the ability to interact with
each other.
For example, Ingold focuses on the literal movement of humanity through the world
with our feet and how this bipedalism inevitably situates us “within a relational field…not of
interconnected points but of interwoven lines.”252 Rather than a separated, independent existence,
humans “grow or ‘issue forth’ along the lines of their relationships.”253 Barad also conceptualizes
a relational being-in-the-world that emphasizes our capacity to act as the defining characteristic
of our relationships.254 Whereas Ingold seeks to illustrate our connections to the world beyond
ourselves, Barad details how our relationality consists of “the enactment of boundaries—that
always entails constitutive exclusions.”255 With exclusion as a consequence of experience, with
“the fact that marks are left on bodies,” accountability emerges as a complement to exclusion.256
We actively construct boundaries; therefore, we must acknowledge the presence of these
boundaries before we can cross them.
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The omnipresence of boundaries, both known and unknown, has implications for the
analysis of everyday life. Barad directs attention towards everyday interaction in her situating
‘position’ as “a property of the phenomenon—the inseparability of ‘observed object’ and
‘agencies of observation.’”257 Events and phenomena, rather than isolated objects, assume
primacy and blur the boundaries of individualized being.
Paying attention to boundaries is to pay attention to my positionality as a researcher in
the ‘field.’ With positionality comes political ramifications and what Madison terms an “ethics of
accountability.”258 Ethical accountability as a researcher materializes in making oneself
“accessible, transparent, and vulnerable to judgment and evaluation.”259 Throughout my study, I
attempt to be as transparent as possible with participants, letting them know what personal
experiences I bring to our conversations and how I interpret their rhetoric. Indeed, I have had to
explain at times what I am interested in when I say ‘rhetoric,’ as the term carries a pejorative
connotation for many.
Awareness of my positionality closely connects to my advocacy for food sovereignty. A
goal of mine is to “actively assist in the struggles” of participants and, when possible, identify
“the tactics, symbols, and everyday forms of resistance” which they enact through their
discourse.260 For example, in my analysis I describe the invention of the municipal ordinance as
a move of tactical deftness, at once appropriating language from legislation elsewhere in the
country and state and yet tailoring the document to articulate their right to produce, process,
consume, and sell foods of their choosing. As I have not yet had the opportunity to pass one of
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these ordinances, the extent of my advocacy for now is constrained to analysis and attempting to
conceive of new possibilities for food sovereignty in Maine.
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS
In this chapter, I proceed through the analysis in three distinct sections, organized
according to common arguments and emergent themes. First, I draw from the rhetorical theory of
Kenneth Burke to explore distinctions between the symbolism and substance of food sovereignty
in Maine and what implications these bring to the fore. I conceive of these distinctions as being
affective and bound with ideas of how sovereignty and politics interact. The primary goal in this
section is to understand what terms food sovereignty advocates use that, as Burke suggests,
“reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise.”261
Second, I demonstrate that these ambiguities, far from presenting a weakness in food
sovereignty’s discourse, serve as a source of attraction to a wide group of people and begin to
constitute a describable community. I draw from Foucault’s notion that discourse should be
“treated as and when it occurs” by attending to its “irruptions.”262 In other words, I analyze the
terms used by advocates to argue that the discourse of food sovereignty forms through the acts,
agents, and purposes that combine in events that disrupt the dominant discourse of an
‘international food regime.’263 This dominant discourse acts as a form of ‘juridical’ or
administrative power enforcing a code of agricultural normalization—it is a discourse of
“discipline.”264 Agrarian lifestyles – and the communities they help to form – act as “subjugated
knowledges”265 within this discourse and the small-scale farm becomes a contested site of power.
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This systematic subjugation of small-scale farming communities creates relationships
between the state and localities perceived as oppressive by food sovereignty advocates. I
articulate how the alternative discourse of food sovereignty in Maine deploys tactical rhetoric to
interrupt, organize, and gain access to the decision-making process.
Third, I bring Elinor Ostrom’s theories of collective resource management to link the
critical discourse theory of Burke and Foucault to the everyday practices that compose food
sovereignty and from which the discourse emerges. Of specific value are Ostrom’s observations
on the effectiveness of “locally designed rule systems”266 based on systems of social obligations
to create ‘laboratories’267 of democratic governance.
To conclude this chapter, I pose questions that align with the ‘constitutive’ rhetoric
concerning equality, liberty, and democracy. I intend that these questions may be used to
strengthen the capacity of food sovereignty advocates to both critique the neoliberal paradigm of
food production and create a viable, vibrant alternative. I want to know if it is possible to
incorporate a nonhuman dimension into the food sovereignty discourse. What might this look
like and what effects could we expect if the demand for rights extends to the physical world
around us? I offer one potential path, namely that food sovereignty advocates conceive of their
work as a form of ‘grassroots diplomacy’ that grounds itself not in identifying one way or
another, but in belonging.268
The ‘Constitutive’ Rhetoric of Food Sovereignty
I begin the analysis with an incongruous pairing, where the formal setting of public
testimony merges with a fable to demonstrate the creative capacity of this discourse to constitute
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an alterity of belonging. In the following example, this alterity gains its discursive force by
disrupting the “epistemic space”269 of a legislative committee hearing. The epistemic space of
legislative committees, courtrooms, and laboratories shape how we collectively create
knowledge. Food sovereignty attempts to shift these spaces outside of legal and scientific spaces
to the farm fields, milking parlors, and ‘kitchen tables’270 of Maine. By using a fable in a space
that demands evidence-based testimony, an advocate implicitly challenges the norms of
governmentality that produce agricultural regulations. In doing so, this example grounds the
‘constitutive’ rhetoric of food sovereignty as the means by which advocates construct an
alternative discourse to the hegemonic one of industrial food production. It exposes the
‘episteme’ of an industrialized regulatory framework, or the “set of relations which define and
situate”271 subjects according to norms of standardized, mechanized, and commodified
agricultural practices.
During a 2013 hearing of the Agriculture, Conservation, and Forestry committee for LD
475: An Act to Increase Food Sovereignty in Local Communities, a citizen supporter of the bill
testified to its merit. After grounding her argument in “the belief that everyone has the right to
healthy, sustainably produced food,” she warns that “the daunting structure of federal laws and
rules…[have] substantially affected” her ability to farm and for customers to access her
products.272 This sense of being arbitrarily constrained by power beyond one’s control emerges
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over the course of this analysis, but I begin with this testimonial because of what this farmer does
next: she shares a fable with the committee. She tells the fable of The Crow and the Pitcher, from
Aesop:
A Crow, ready to die with thirst, flew with joy to a Pitcher which he beheld at
some distance. When he came, he found water in it, indeed, but so near the
bottom, that with all his stooping and straining, he was not able to reach it. He
then endeavoured to overturn the Pitcher, that at least he might be able to get a
little of it; but his strength was not sufficient for the accomplishment of this
purpose. At last seeing some pebbles lie near the place, he cast them one by one
into the Pitcher, and thus, by degrees, raised the water up to the very brim, and
satisfied his thirst.273
By retelling this fable she constructs what Kenneth Burke calls a ‘perspective by incongruity;’274
by placing fables in the committee chamber, she merges a text and context that normally stay
separate. This combination produces new possibilities for interpretation and attempts to change
the social behavior of an otherwise solemn occasion. Using this fable as a rhetorical device, she
implies that the work of food sovereignty in the state can overcome a daunting regulatory
structure. She uses the metaphor of pebbles to represent the towns in Maine that have passed
ordinances and urges the committee to pass the bill on to the legislature. To do so would be to
“support the towns…who are picking up the pebbles, one by one, to raise the level of resilience
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in the state of Maine by protecting our local food supply and our traditional ways of exchanging
food.”275
This testimony helps illustrate the central themes I identify in my analysis of the
discourse of food sovereignty in Maine, which include identification, discursive construction,
and political conditioning. The fable conveys its meaning through symbolism; how we use
language resides in its capacity as symbolic action. As an allegorical story, this symbolism
functions arbitrarily and with the purpose to impart lessons or morals to the audience. In the case
above, the speaker delivers these lessons in a two-fold way, both as a metaphor for the work food
sovereignty advocates in the state do and as a means to humanize the situation. Many relate to
the fable as a genre of storytelling because of a childhood experience of reading one with an
adult. By bringing her experience of using fables to teach children at home into the public
hearing, this advocate aligns the intent of food sovereignty with the intent of any community—
that of raising young ones well. Notably, however, the messages we intend for children still
resonate as we age and bear fruit if we return to them once in a while.
A fable’s resonance comes from its capacity to ‘set’ an example, to influence the
behavior of a listener by creating a model to imitate for their benefit. In its exemplary power, the
fable shares the company of other rhetorical devices that seek to influence: the myth, proverb, or
parable. To set the theoretical stage for this analysis, I therefore make the connection with Brian
Massumi’s emphasis on parables as a writing style that affects us through its use of
exemplification.276 Parables and fables illustrate through their activation of detail, where a
digression can unfold into a moment of creativity and invention. Fables enable us to make new
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interpretations, they fabricate. Fabulists are creators, inventors of interpretation and makers of
morals.
For this discursive analysis, beginning with a fable used to testify to the intent of food
sovereignty yields insight into the shared values articulated in Maine because the fable helps
show how rhetorical tactics, such as the use of allegory to create ruptures and resist formal
power, shape the discourse of food sovereignty. Etymologically, ‘fable’ refers to the action of
speaking, fābula meaning ‘discourse,’ in Latin.277 It shares its roots with that of ‘fate,’ or that
which has been spoken. There is, then, an element of prophecy in fables or parables, of prediction or pre-scription, of recommendation and advice. As rhetorical devices, they provide an
opportunity to look forward into the future and towards what we may become. They offer
glimpses of possibility. Through their symbolic creativity, fables recondition how we know the
world and turn it into something new. This is why they make great bedtime stories, because they
plant seeds of hope that can grow in the sweet soil of dreams.
Such invention carries with it a lot of potential and can weave many stories with many
morals. Thus we look for guidance to those fabulists who exercise discernment and whose
decisions about the things we hold in common impact all of us. In short, we look to judges. In
numerous instances, food sovereignty activists invoke Supreme Court cases that serve as a sort
of adult fable, an example of how those in positions of power should reason.
In particular, during the public hearing for LD 783: RESOLUTION, Proposing an
Amendment to the Constitution of Maine To Establish a Right to Food, testimonials referred to
two specific Supreme Court opinions that offer prescient morals for both food sovereignty and
the three branches of government in Maine that it affects. The first was the dissenting opinion of
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Justice Stephen Johnson Field in the 1888 case of Powell v. The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania,278 who writes that the court ruling, in effect, sanctioned “the arbitrary deprivation
of life and liberty.”279 He uses food production as the basis of his exegesis and the prime
example of what is due all United States citizens:
By ‘liberty’…is meant something more than freedom from physical restraint or
imprisonment. It means freedom, not merely to go wherever one may choose, but
to do such acts as he may judge best for his interest not inconsistent with the equal
rights of others; that is, to follow such pursuits as may be best adapted to his
faculties, and which will give to him the highest enjoyment….The right to pursue
one’s happiness is placed by the declaration of independence among the
inalienable rights of man…to secure them, not to grant them, governments are
instituted among men. The right to procure healthy and nutritious food, by which
life may be preserved and enjoyed, and to manufacture it, is among these
inalienable rights, which…no state can give, and no state can take away.280
Herein lies a principle tension that runs not only through the history of the United States, but
through the discourse of food sovereignty in Maine as well—namely, that of equality and liberty.
We are all equal in our right to liberty, but we constitute governments to protect – or “secure” –
our equal access to those liberties, including “the right to produce, process, sell, purchase, and
consume local foods.”281 By placing that burden of responsibility onto governments, we also
cede certain abilities to those in government, principally the ability to execute, legislate, and

278

127 U.S. 678 (1888). Justice Field defends an oleo-margarine manufacturer who was indicted for selling a product
deemed threatening to public health. In his dissent, he claims the ruling of the court violates the due process clause
of the 14th amendment of US Constitution.
279
Ibid.
280
Ibid.
281
Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance, 2014

63

judge laws by which we all consent to abide. Engagement with the law – as food sovereignty in
Maine does at multiple levels and with all three branches – is to enter into a dialectical
relationship that uses and is used by rhetoric to make meaning.
James Boyd White describes this dialectic as underlying “constitutive rhetoric,” referring
to the type of language that “enables people to say ‘we’ about what they do and to claim
consistent meanings for it.”282 The ‘we’ in food sovereignty includes a wide range of people,
both producers and consumers of food, who coalesce into a community that shares values and a
sense of equality and liberty and traces its logic through a set of legal and historical precedents in
the United States. Food sovereignty’s constitutive rhetoric has sufficient “motive”283 in the
small-scale agricultural practices of production and consumption to generate texts in the form of
municipal ordinances. Using White’s notion of “constitutive rhetoric,” I conceive of these
ordinances, which follow a basic template, as the ‘constitution’ of food sovereignty in Maine.
To textually constitute the motives of food sovereignty, however, is to use necessarily
vague language and, therefore, to open the door to “the ambiguities of substance.”284 Constitutive
rhetoric remains vague because it suggests the terms by which ‘we’ judge our public acts. It
focuses our attention towards certain patterns of experience and away from others because of
‘our’ shared values and collective sense of what ‘we’ need. These patterns shift over time; the
vagueness of terms enables our interpretations of the constitution to shift along with those
patterns so that we may bring the new conditions of life to bear on the ‘principles’ that constitute
us. It is to these principles that we must bear witness.
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I return to this discussion of principles in the following section that discusses how food
sovereignty in Maine articulates its identity, or how its process of identification unfolds through
the language of its advocates. To complement the emphasis on securing our rights from Justice
Field’s dissent, advocates also reference Justice Louis Brandeis’ dissenting opinion from New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann in 1932.285 Famous for its claim that any state can serve as a
“laboratory” of democracy, this opinion focuses its judgment on the imperative “to meet
changing social and economic needs.”286 As an example of how constitutions serve as guides or
heuristic models yet still bind us as statements of our collective will, Brandeis concludes his
dissent as follows:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This
Court has the power to prevent an experiment…[b]ut, in the exercise of this high
power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal
principles.287
A source of inspiration to food sovereignty in Maine, Brandeis’ opinion speaks to the notion that
‘we’ must always engage in the democratic process in order to keep our government accountable
and to make those in power aware of the conditions on the ground. In the words of one advocate,
government is a set of relations “that we do together with”,288 rather than ‘they’ do separately
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without ‘us.’ Access to the process is one principle that food sovereignty puts forth because the
very lack of access to the regulatory and rule enforcement process serves as its motive.
The emphasis in food sovereignty, as in Brandeis, lies on the democratic process as one
of experimentation, creativity, and invention. In this light, I return to the fable of the crow and
the pitcher. Having identified its motive – thirst – the crow satisfies its thirst through creative
expression, experimentation, and using the available means. Similarly, White reminds us that
rhetoric, like law, “invents not out of nothing but out of something.”289 We use the means
available to us to constitute communities around principles. We share questions of meaning, not
some sort of transcendental truth. Our constitutions mold the questions we ask in order to direct
us towards certain answers while still leaving them open to interpretation.
By outlining this notion of ‘constitutive’ rhetoric as playing a key role for advocates of
food sovereignty in Maine, I frame the subsequent analysis of its discourse as one that creates
boundaries that define the people and the principles involved in its expression. Through the use
of ‘constitutive’ rhetoric, food sovereignty in Maine articulates a sense of belonging that appeals
to some but not all. I claim that this is necessary if food sovereignty is to ‘succeed’ in Maine.
The sense of belonging I witness within the food sovereignty community forms a crucial part of
developing the ‘grassroots diplomacy’ that the discourse creates and sustains.
Identification in Food Sovereignty: Symbolic and Substantial
In developing his conception of ‘substance,’ Burke draws on the word’s etymology in the
idea of ‘place’ or ‘placement.’290 Although in common usage it refers to an intrinsic quality, it
derives from a sense of the extrinsic or the external qualities that affect things. In other words,
‘substance’ derives its meaning from any thing’s context or environment in the sense that these
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support or underlie a thing’s interiority. Burke calls this tension between the inner and outer
worlds of things the “paradox of substance”; by speaking of something’s ‘substance,’ one refers
to what it is by using a term that designates what it is not.291
Such a paradox, for Burke, lies at the heart of human language. We cannot speak of
things in their essence, so we “necessarily talk about things in terms of what they are not.”292
Language is symbolic ‘action’ that serves as “labels, signs for helping us find our way about,”
and can be misused as easily as used well.293 To speak of the substance of food sovereignty, I
define it in terms of its context in Maine as advocates describe it to me, but remain aware of the
symbolic limits of their descriptions. Their words serve as a symbolic guide for this analysis.
In this analysis, three emergent themes define the context of food sovereignty in Maine,
including ‘sovereignty as…,’ ‘political corruption or the appearance of corruption,’ and ‘affect.’
In describing these components of how advocates identify with food sovereignty, I explore
individual voices as representative of the themes. Although I condense the themes out of the
interviews and documents analyzed, I want the individual voices to emerge as the means by
which I put theory in conversation with their practice and vice versa.
For the first theme, sovereignty not only refers to liberty and unimpeded authority, it also
speaks to the social obligations that form community and collective capacity for resilience when
facing uncertainty. This variation points towards the heterogeneous substance composing the
patterns of experience that motivate their advocacy.
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For example, ‘sovereignty’ acts as a sort of unifying community value. Helen is a smallscale farmer who produces raw milk and poultry for sale in her community. The context of food
sovereignty clearly lies with how communities build and sustain connections, even though these
connections suffer from what she calls a “labyrinth” of structural bias pitting localities against
state and federal governments. To elaborate this conception, she distinguishes between the
“inside” and “outside” of farming communities. For example, in describing the history of
Hancock County’s dairy farms, she points to the progressive encroachment of regulations
eroding the ability of dairy farmers in the area to maintain micro-dairies (of 8-10 cows). In doing
so, she characterizes the regulatory pressure as “tinkering [from] outside the farming
communities.”
Designating state actions as ‘tinkering’ implies that one intent of the regulatory structure
– to sanitize the process of dairy farming – has unintended consequences. Namely, that of ending
a “traditional foodway” in the mid-coast region of Maine. Attempts to repair or systematize
small farming communities have been little better than tinkering, or clumsy efforts to ‘improve’
dairy farming in the aggregate while ignoring the idiosyncrasies of communities in different
places.
She furthers this argument when discussing the “overlapping jurisdictions” present in
food regulation. For example, the regulatory structure of food and agriculture is fragmented
enough that different agencies regulate the same product depending on its use and source.294
Helen uses a spatial metaphor to articulate how communities use municipal ordinances to
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navigate this overlapping legal field. If food regulations consist of a single field, then “there is
more than one player on that field” making decisions about how to classify food. With the
ordinance, local communities create the capacity to play in that field. In this, they also designate
their boundaries in relation to the numerous state and federal agencies that occupy the field. By
metaphorically applying “counter pressure” on the state of Maine, municipalities can tell the
state that “you’re not needed here…this is our food and here’s where we’re drawing the line.”
Concern for where to draw community boundaries is a political issue and one that draws
from how we designate matters of concern. What concerns us depends on the questions we ask
and the motives for questioning the ways we arrange the world. For Burke, “the assigning of
motives is a matter of appeal.”295 Difference in motives from one group of people to another
change according to the patterns of experience that form their community, but also change, as
Burke notes, through rhetorical emphases that alter “the scope of the orientation within which the
tactics of appeal are framed.”296 In this sense I move into another conception of sovereignty that
complements the idea that sovereignty means applying pressure on the state from the municipal
level by connecting community building to the process of food production.
Jeff practices permaculture, or the system of environmental design that aims to develop
stable socio-ecological systems based on agricultural production that cultivates perennial (instead
of annual) crops. In effect, permacultural food systems pattern themselves after ecosystems
rather than agricultural methods that depend on tillage to grow crops. From this perspective, Jeff
connects the idea of sovereignty with that of resilience or regeneration. As a permaculturalist, he
perceives a need for underlying design principles to guide the transformation of the food system
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from its concentrated industrial form to one of “small-scale, distributed production.” Jeff makes
the connection explicit in the following quote:
…in order for a people to be sovereign unto themselves, they need a stable food
production system and contemporary industrial agriculture, organic or not, I don’t
see as being as stable as a perennial style of food production that’s modeled on
natural ecosystems.
Sovereignty, as a practice in this conceptualization, diffuses production for stability.
Concentrated production—that which the industrial regulatory system encourages—creates rigid
organizational structures that struggle to withstand stress as well as more distributed systems.
The polycultural practices of permaculture, for Jeff, complement an associated world-view that
attempts to compose an “arrangement of elements on the surface of the planet [that] is more
resilient to those external shocks…in the face of floods or droughts, which are what is coming,
what lies ahead.”
As an example of the shift in perspective when thinking through how to re-compose our
socio-economic systems, Jeff points to the irony found in many places within the industrial food
system. When policy makers enforce regulations intended to create food safety, they address the
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) that produce massive amounts of manure in a
single location. As an example of what the perspectival shift would entail, he suggests that “in
that kind of large-scale production mode, waste is pollution….whereas if you change the
production model and change the management regimes, those waste streams from those
animals…can be harnessed in a regenerative capacity.”
Sovereignty connotes resilience for another community member, although the context for
using the term ‘sovereignty,’ for Nicholas, merits special attention. He needed to understand the
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motives behind food sovereignty in Maine before he could lend support as an organizer affiliated
with a non-profit that works to foster sustainable development. For Nicholas, at first blush the
ordinance seemed more ideologically driven than having practical goals to attain for the
community. He found the language of ‘sovereignty’ and local control questionable, not least
because, historically, it has been used, among other things, “to justify slavery in the South…
[and] more recently, deny gay marriage in certain areas of the country.” In other words, without
clarifying the context in which communities demand to exert it, sovereignty is not an inherently
good or bad thing.
As such, he addresses the context of the ordinance for communities in Maine by
highlighting resilience as a key motivation driving the ordinance in his community (Rockland).
Resilience connects closely with how communities produce food at the local level. From this
perspective, the industrial food system creates an unsustainable and widespread dependence on
multinational corporations that produce and transport food. To achieve collective resilience, food
sovereignty addresses this reliance:
The assertion of food sovereignty…is an assertion of local control over our food
production and, in fact, it’s a way of privileging local, small-scale farms...over
large, industrial farms in other states or other countries…it’s about…trying to
reduce our…reliance or dependence on large corporations.
Using a systems-thinking approach, Nicholas emphasizes the different motivations at work in
local food systems, or systems characterized by a “tight feedback loop the local corporations or
local individuals have with their customers.” Conglomerates cannot have such tight feedback
loops. In other words, money and other resources—as well as affective resources like
accountability—cannot stay within communities when the company profiting is headquartered
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elsewhere. Asserting local control, for Nicholas, increases a community’s ability to provide for
itself economically. In a word, the community has more resilience.
Taking a more ecological perspective, Nicholas echoes Jeff by connecting this notion of
resilience as local control or sovereignty with the notion of resilience as the ability to respond to
environmental crises. He conceives of the ordinance’s focus on food production systems as a
means to plan for an uncertain future. Community resilience, in this regard, again ties into
keeping food production and consumption as local as possible. Nicholas contrasts this with the
sense of a precarious food system that depends on “remote” food production and the limitations
this places on an individual community to respond.
We just don’t know what the world is going to look like in regards to climate or
anything else in fifty years. And the less we have to rely on remote, industrial
models…the safer we’re going to be in terms of our own resilience and our own
response, whether it be something catastrophic or something relatively mundane,
like the slow creep of climate change.
The emphasis on sovereignty as local control in the interviews with Nicholas and Jeff
repeats in the testimony of state representatives in support of LD 218: An Act to Promote SmallScale Poultry Farming that passed through the legislature in 2013. Advocating for a regulatory
exemption for farmers slaughtering fewer than 1,000 poultry a year, these two legislators argue
that the licensing and facilities requirements for small-scale poultry producers arbitrarily
transgresses the community boundaries that Helen speaks of above. By so doing, the industry
argument that food safety is paramount appears less concerned with safety per se, and more
concerned with how technologically developed farms become. This first quote demonstrates how
sovereignty concerns itself with the rightful attribution of responsibility and accountability when
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it comes to food production: “Safety in all aspects of food production, processing, and
preparation is the responsibility of all who produce, process, purchase, prepare, and consume
food. Methods of enhancing food safety will be most effective if they concentrate on education
and training rather than concentrating on facilities and equipment construction details.”297
In the discourse of food sovereignty, members identify with the idea of sovereignty as
more than simply a question of authority. Rather, authority connects with concerns for how
communities draw their boundaries and what practices those boundaries allow. When it comes to
the need for food safety, the ‘constitutive’ rhetoric of food sovereignty leads one to ask questions
that concern the authorship of food production itself. Who grew this tomato? Or, how was this
squash grown? Rather than the bacterial count or the levels of inspection any given food product
has, these types of questions generate a discourse that focuses on how, “apparently, the best food
safety measure is knowing the grower and having their name on the product.”298
In sum, advocates express diverse meanings about what sovereignty connotes, including
community, resiliency, local control, and an alternative sense of food safety. I now transition to a
second theme of identification, that of political behavior and the appearance of corruption in
politics. This theme symbolizes the disconnection between motives of food sovereignty
advocates and those that underlie the industrial regulatory structure.
Concerns voiced about the nature of politics throughout the interview process as well as
in testimony offer substance in the sense that the political ‘climate’ surrounding agricultural
regulation in Maine deeply affects the context of food sovereignty’s emergent discourse.
Advocates find motives in what they see as corruption, unfettered lobbying, and systematic
disenfranchisement of their political voice, both in ‘Augusta’ and at home in their communities.
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In identifying political behavior as a cause of bias against them, they perform a consistent
identification amongst themselves. This theme bridges the first and third themes of identification.
The conceptions of sovereignty present in the way we arrange ourselves in the world only go so
far if elected (and unelected) officials act as barriers to an accessible democratic process; through
political patterns of experience in the legislature and elsewhere, advocates come to develop, in
the third theme, political savvy that turns on affection.
Bea offers a compelling perspective into the political theater of ‘Augusta’299 as a
community organizer, non-profit leader, and part-time lobbyist in the state legislature advocating
for small-scale farming communities in Maine. She refers to political behavior at state and
federal levels as significant barriers to reasonable policy making. A principal focus concerns the
idea of a “revolving door” between business and government agencies, where legislators or
administrators have either worked in or join the private sector that they now regulate and vice
versa. For example, Bea discusses the Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA), who
regularly represents the opposition to food sovereignty in the state legislature, and in particular
an influential lobbyist for the organization: “The woman who is now the lobbyist for the GMA
came right out of the department of agriculture…she is going and writing the 2500 dollar checks
[to political action committees].”
In this example, Bea draws attention to the perception that “money is speech.” Lobbyists
sway the political process in their favor through material means. Using Kenneth Burke’s theory
of language as symbolic action, the notion that “money is speech” points to the irreducible
connection of language to the physical realm, or “nonsymbolic motion.”300 Legislation or
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policies drafted that systematically favor corporate agribusiness and an industrial model of food
distribution relate to the financial gain implicit within such a regulatory structure. The symbolic
mode of finance takes form through the implementation of overly-burdensome regulation for
small-scale farmers.
Until we get money out of politics, these lobbyists are going to have enormous,
enormous impact. [They have] been playing the game for a long time, because
[they] went from working in Augusta to lobbying in Augusta, [they] knew all the
players and they know [the lobbyists] and…when they go into the back room of
the committee meeting to caucus, [the lobbyists go] with them. I mean, [they are]
‘invited.’
Experiences such as these, when perpetuated at a state-by-state and federal level, contribute to
the ‘liberalization’ of agriculture that McMichael and others point to.301 The discursive
construction of systemic bias occurs through the symbolic actions in state legislatures. Closeddoor meetings between legislators and lobbyists have outsized effects on the daily processes of
small farms whose actions fall under the jurisdiction of these committees.
With the representative process (or synecdochic relationship)302 seemingly broken, the
tactical rhetoric of food sovereignty in Maine uses metonymy to focus attention on and amplify
the sense of collusion between government and industry. Merging concerns about the vitality of
small-scale farms and ecological degradation, Bea summarizes this political behavior as
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‘greenwashing’ and suggests that, to remedy agro-industrial bias, the locus of decision-making
must shift back to localities:
organic agriculture can feed the world. True organic agriculture, not this
greenwashed, commercial organic agriculture. The mono-cropping, the feeding
cows in feedlots with organic grain and calling it organic meat. That’s not going
to help the climate at all. But [what will is] small, organic farmers, taking good
care of their soil and selling their food locally so you don’t have the carbon
footprint of transportation…the way you support small local farmers is you let
them scale to the appropriate scale for them. You don’t make them get big or get
out.303
By allowing local control of food production, regulatory measures bubble up rather than trickle
down. Numerous citizens express astonishment at how closely the perspectives of leading food
companies and federal regulators align when it comes to a ‘right to food.’304 Describing the
statements as having sent a “shockwave through my body” and “astounding,” one testifier claims
they amount to “tak[ing] away our right to choose from whom we obtain our food.”305
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Similarly, a legislator testified that “the corruption, and the appearance of corruption, has
got to stop. It is tearing at the fabric of my community.”306 The appearance of corruption comes
from the “arbitrary and capricious application of food safety laws”307 preventing farmers from
producing food for their community, limiting consumer access to local and fresh food, and
straining community relations by subjecting them to regulation. As an example of how the
dominant regulatory discourse helps to create food sovereignty’s alternative one, testifiers ask
questions that lead to different conclusions than if they were concerned with a regulation-defined
‘safe’ food product: “are we not capable to look at a local food producer face to face and make a
decision about whether or not we want to consume their product?”308 This type of rhetorical
question subverts the appeals of government regulators for food safety – according to their
standards – by privileging direct access to food producers.
Some take this sentiment further when describing the “faceless corporations” responsible
for the majority of food-borne illnesses in the United States.309 Within the food sovereignty
discourse, rules that claim to strengthen food safety meet with a skepticism suggesting such rules
“sound an awful lot like the fox guarding the hen house.”310
An extended example of this comes from Sarah and David, a couple who own a goat
dairy small enough that they do not sell product, but would like to sell surplus milk and cheese
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when they have any. They have felt numerous times either confused or deceived by how the state
enforces its own laws and shares this information. As owners of a micro-dairy, they looked into
the rules regarding licensure in the event that they might want to sell any excess product in the
community. Having taken the initiative to contact the state department of agriculture, Sarah
claims that she was “manipulated into an appointment with an inspector,” in spite of the fact that
she realized, through self-education, that it would not make sense for them to be licensed.
This initial contact with the state has led to repeated interactions with inspectors that
leave them suspecting that state employees do not understand the rules governing food
production in the state. This apparent dissonance fuels their suggestion that the political process
itself is fundamentally flawed and disconnected from the consequences it has on small-scale
farmers.
For example, in her meeting with the state inspector, Sarah recounts how, after reading
the statute regarding the definition of ‘milk distributor,’ the inspector seemed unaware that the
law states that any dairy farmer is technically a ‘distributor.’311 This episode exemplifies for her
the confusing nature of agricultural law:
The problem with this whole thing is, even if you want to learn, the problem is
that there is not just a statute, but behind the statute are milk rules. And, of course,
the milk rules have their own definitions…I think this is on purpose, creating this
confusion that you get lost and don’t know and have to listen to the inspectors.
David suggests that part of the problem lies in the separation between the legislative and rulemaking processes. The former is public and the latter private (without public input). In line with
what other interviewees suggest, their pattern of experience with state level politics points to a
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sense that a structural bias creates this confusion. The rule-making process remains convoluted,
even if the statutes appear straightforward, making licensing an onerous, if not impossible
(because of exorbitant costs), task for small-scale farmers.
When they send you the milk rules that are made for big milk plants and you have
really only one or three goats—you will not go through 180 pages to figure out
what it is about or what applies to you. It’s really confusing.
Not only does this bias seem directed against small-scale farmers, it also seems to favor
larger producers. The biggest issue for Sarah and David is not financial burden of compliance,
but rather that “they make it [seem] that it is so easy. And it is—and this is the scary part—it is
easy, or it can be easy.” If regulations do not present a big enough financial burden for the farm,
then the farm can pass muster with relative ease.
I conclude the theme of political behavior and the appearance of corruption by leading
this discussion to ‘affect’ in talking about how the power of political discourse often lies in its
use (or manipulation) of emotion. The affective dimension of food sovereignty comes in the next
thematic section, but I foreshadow this transition to argue that money can have a greater
influence over legislation in the statehouse – within the current industrialist discourse – than can
emotion. Alan, a state legislator and supporter of food sovereignty, attempts to explain this
dynamic by sharing “how politics really works.” This euphemism emphasizes the emotional
character of political discourse, or how, rather than making decisions on a rational basis, most
people make “an emotional decision and then rationalize that, picking whatever information fits
that emotional decision.”
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Politics as an emotional pursuit resonates with Ernesto Laclau’s analysis of the
metonymic quality to popular political discourses.312 Narratives that typify and shape the
political realm rely on what Laclau calls ‘equivalential logic,’ or a mode of reasoning that relies
on the affective connections that people make with one another through the process of
identification.313 Such logic enables mass mobilizations of people towards a single political goal.
This equivalency through identification, however, always also depends on a ‘differential logic,’
or a mode of reasoning that identifies ‘the other’ as a result of identifying with an ‘us’ or ‘we.’
These discursive constructions form along affective fault lines and dictate socio-political control.
Coming to the notion of control in this sense follows Alan’s logic as he discusses the
emotional arguments made by food sovereignty and how they ultimately get at a question of
control:
things about do we have a right to food, do we have a right to choose what we eat,
or do we have to eat what some corporation tells us we must eat, or what the
government tells us we must eat or not eat, in other words. These are emotional
issues…there’s not a lot of rationality to it. Do I want somebody else dictating to
me…the choices that I make? [...] The major argument there is who has control.
Political culture revolves around the perpetual negotiation of control. Food sovereignty, for Alan,
comes to this negotiation through emotional argumentation, or what he calls “the fundamental
feeling that people have that they should have a right to food of their own choice.” While the
tactical rhetoric of food sovereignty advances an emotional argument, however, that of industry
combines emotion with the potency of money.
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Political opponents to food sovereignty in the Maine legislature consistently characterize
raw milk as ‘dangerous,’ a description that Alan considers effective to the extent that it is an
‘emotional’ argument.314 A further connection he makes, however, is that this argument is not
effective enough on its own (i.e. the emotional arguments of food sovereignty are stronger than
those of ‘food safety’), so it need the financial clout of the industry lobby to influence legislators.
I don’t know that the industry holds sway by lobbyists because they’re making
emotional arguments. I think the industry holds sway with their lobbyists
primarily by their monetary donations to the political action committees that fund
the elections of the people that they’re swaying…As a general matter, that’s the
way our political system works—that is, lobbyists being influenced by monetary
donations, which are often laundered through political action committees.
Alan points out that he cannot be certain about the exact influence of corporate lobbyists. His
larger point consists in that food sovereignty, whose central argument concerns control over the
local means of production and governance, meets resistance in the legislative process from
competing forces exercising control through different means (i.e. money). Thus, the negotiation
for control seems poisoned or that industry has an unfair advantage over small farming
communities through their outsized financial influence.
Political corruption or the appearance of corruption act as catalysts for identification with
the food sovereignty effort. Patterns of experience align for advocates – whether in the
legislature, on the farm, or observing from a distance – in their frustration at the simultaneous
increase of regulatory pressure and decrease of local community influence on the rule-making
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process at the state level. This seeming impasse leads advocates to look towards their
communities for political solutions. The third and final theme of how identification develops in
food sovereignty concerns the affective relations that constitute the foundation of both local food
commerce and the constitutive rhetoric found in the municipal ordinances. I close with this
theme because it serves as an effective transition into the second section of this analysis, which
describes how advocates construct their discourse out of a concern for their communities rather
than personal gain.
In this analysis, affect plays the key role in defining how advocates constitute their
rhetoric and construct their discourse. For the purposes of identification, it also forms the basic
motive for the symbolic action of food sovereignty. To frame this theme, I put Kenneth Burke
and Ernesto Laclau in conversation. Specifically, Burke’s emphasis on the “paradox of
substance” as the primary gesture of language—or the definition of things in terms of what they
are not—resonates with Laclau’s claim that catachresis forms “the common denominator of
‘rhetoricity.’”315 Catachresis speaks to a distortion of meaning or of the improper use of terms
because of our inability to literally translate a thing’s essence. Affect fills in the gaps in meaning
that language leaves behind.
For Laclau, the archetype of catachresis is the term ‘the people,’ which depends on the
power of affect to complement the inadequacy of the term itself and support its power to rally a
heterogeneous group to its cause. In this formulation we see Burke’s paradox at work: the
symbolic (‘we the people’) always refers to the nonsymbolic (affect) for its motive force.316
Through this complementary relationship forms the “equivalential logics” mentioned earlier that
link disparate groups of people together. In the case of food sovereignty, affect performs a
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similar role connecting producers and consumers together in a way that does not reflect the
dominant mode of relationship Americans have to food. However, this alterity acts as both an
affordance and a constraint to its growth. To gain a more ‘popular’ or widespread following,
food sovereignty in Maine must conceive of how to link with other social demands being made
in order to form the “chains” of equivalency that compose a populist (and revolutionary) political
imaginary.317
Affective relations act as a “radical investment” in communities that lays a foundation for
a diffuse regulatory structure and pluralistic access to the democratic process. In the following
discussion, I show how affect enables the alternative discourse of food sovereignty to gain
popular support. 318 From an analytical perspective, this articulation concludes this section on
identification and situates the advocates as prepared to construct a “minoritarian” discourse.319
Conceiving of alternatives to a biased system of regulations and developing collective
decision-making depends on articulating an alternative community ethos. For Harold, a
community member who does not farm but supports small-scale farming to the extent that he
can, such an articulation happens through acknowledging that the agro-industrial food system
creates eaters whose “trained incapacities” develop on account of the distance between ourselves
and our food.320
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This distance distracts from our ability to critically perceive the extent to which
corporations control the industrial food system. For many eaters within this system, such
physical and conceptual distance obscures the “fundamental link to the humble embeddedness”
of human existence in the world. “We think we can do anything—and we can do many things—
but we do a lot of those things at our peril.” Food sovereignty
has spawned discussions about basic issues of trust between members of a
community who know one another…that is different from the kind of trust that
you have to have when you go into any supermarket and pick up food that has
been flown from Peru or trucked in from California or gone through a dozen
different processing operations
Closing the gap between ourselves and our food depends on making trust “immediate, palpable.”
Metaphorically, this conception of a sovereign local food system begins with sense-making. The
idea that, when one goes to purchase food at a neighboring farm, they also feel “something
resonating from the fields.” Claiming that the current industrial food system encourages us to
“give up your senses,” Harold makes the connection between ourselves and our food an intimate
one.
You still have to rely upon the senses God gave you, which means you have to
know what those things are…what to pay attention to when your crap detector
says ‘something’s wrong here,’ either in consistency or appearance…our lives
depend on it.
Cultivating our senses to food builds collective knowledge as to what food production
entails. Harold claims that strengthening this collective knowledge helps in strengthening “the
sense of security that people have when they buy food, when they cook it.” In the tactical
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rhetoric of food sovereignty, advocates link this sense of security with proximity to food
production. In this discursive construction, systemic bias and inability to access the decisionmaking process have material consequences in the form of losing touch with our sensual food
landscapes.
the gaps between what we know and think and can do on the larger scale of things
where everything is in the FDA’s hands, or the department of agriculture, and
what I can do and feel comfortable asking in my own local environment are huge,
huge!
Gaps between what we know we can do and what we should do, as Harold describes here,
resembles what Hannah Arendt calls the “assumed time lag” between the technical ability of
humanity and humanistic developments such as rights and laws that direct that ability for the
common good.321
This relates to agricultural regulation and ‘food safety’ in particular in a dialectic that
squeezes peasant and small-scale farming communities the world over: as the technological
capacity of humans to produce enormous quantities of food develops, the regulatory structure
also develops not to constrain the use of agricultural technology, but to accommodate and even
facilitate its adoption. In Maine, this reality comes to bear through the enforcement of regulations
that require new and small-scale farmers to purchase expensive equipment and facilities in order
to meet safety codes. If they cannot afford these, little recourse exists for them to pursue but to
take on debt in the form of loans or to remain unlicensed and unable to sell raw dairy or
unlicensed meat products.
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In the abstract, this ethical ‘time lag’ asks questions of propriety and forces consideration
of what is appropriate in any given time and place.322 The assertion of rights central to the food
sovereignty platform calls attention to the perceived inappropriateness of regulation that effaces \
small-scale farmers as valued members of local food systems. Such impropriety comes to the
fore especially in times of environmental stress, when the means of food production come into
public view as a matter of necessary concern.
Renee, a city councilor who supports food sovereignty, addresses this reality by returning
to the idea of achieving resilience through food sovereignty, but taking into account the affective
dimension of resilient communities. A primary motive for her support is concern for how to
increase her community’s capacity to adapt to social and environmental changes that she sees on
the horizon. In discussing this question of adaptation, she uses a recent example of how the
industrial food system creates such an ethical ‘time lag’ as mentioned above:
We just had that flooding down in Florida and North Carolina and what
happened? Those huge lagoons of pig waste got flooded and now they have
significant pollution. The whole thing just seems like an idea run amuck. And
then as we grow more and more safety-conscious, it’s all of a sudden you can’t
bring a casserole to a community event. You have to become a certified
[commercial] kitchen to make something. I trust this idea that, if we know our
neighbors, it’s okay for me to buy eggs from my neighbor who now has four
chickens, you know?

The concept of Kairos is key for these types of consideration. See Aaron Hess. “Critical-Rhetorical Ethnography:
Rethinking the Place and Process of Rhetoric.” Communication Studies 62, 2 (2011): 127-152. I discuss the
importance of Kairos for my research in more detail in chapter 2.
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This quote compares the affective dimensions of community to the technical and often
flawed dynamics of the agro-industrial system. In the first sentence, Renee alludes to the impact
of Hurricane Matthew in September and October 2016 on CAFO operations (mainly hog and
chicken farms) in North Carolina. In the aftermath of this storm, 36 factory farms along the
Neuse, Black, and Cape Fear rivers flooded, leading to widespread water contamination in North
Carolina’s coastal floodplain with bacteria such as e-coli and salmonella.323 This example points
to the precarious way in which the industrial food system concentrates both food production and
waste products to an extent that violent storms such as Matthew can lead to rapid and devastating
consequences for surrounding communities. Instances like this erode public trust in an industrial
food system that fails to adapt to realities facing us, namely less predictable but more powerful
weather patterns.
Renee juxtaposes this lack of trust in the industrial food system with the trust that
undergirds communities in Maine that advocate for food sovereignty. The rhetorical tactic here is
to compare the relative risks between a food system that, as seen through North Carolina,
endangers large portions of the population in a relatively short amount of time and one that seeks
to mitigate such risk through a reliance on neighborly relations. The comparison does not say
that a community with a food sovereignty ordinance would somehow weather a hurricane better
than the communities in North Carolina’s coastal floodplain, but rather that they would recover
without the wide-ranging and immeasurable effects of fecal contamination in the watershed. This
perspective seeks, above all, to radically re-distribute the means by which we produce and

See Soren Rundquist, “Exposing Fields of Filth: After Hurricane, First Detailed Look at Flooding of Feces-Laden
N.C. Factory Farms,” Environmental Working Group, http://www.ewg.org/research/exposing-fields-filth-hurricanematthew. For a study that measures the sanitary quality of waters near CAFOs, see Heaney et al., “Source Tracking
Swine Fecal Waste in Surface Water Proximal to Swine Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations,” Science of the
Total Environment 511 (2015): 676-683.
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consume food—such redistribution would, as the logic goes, protect farmers and consumers alike
from the worst effects of a concentrated and, thus, vulnerable food system.
Vulnerability, in this sense, speaks to the large-scaled means of agricultural production
prevalent throughout the United States. Such systemic vulnerability also manifests at the
personal level in ways that food sovereignty advocates see as highly inappropriate. The
impropriety relates, as with Renee, to the loss of trust between community members and their
government and how it seems to promote dangerous food production practices predicated on, as
seen in the following example, the ways in which regulators use language.
This sense of distrust and impropriety occurs in a strange rhetorical situation regarding
dairy labelling. An official designation distinguishes ‘pasteurized’ products from ‘heat-treated’
products. The former undergoes pasteurization in “aseptic conditions” whereas the latter does so
in “septic conditions.”324 The different classification amounts to heat-treated dairy products
reaching the same temperature for the same length of time as pasteurized products, but doing so
in uncovered containers. Bacteria are still eliminated, but, technically, pasteurization occurs in
specific machinery that is often prohibitively expensive for small-scale producers like Sarah and
David. Thus, the classification is as much a financial as a processing one.
Such interactions with the state—both at home and in the state house—fuel the argument
that food sovereignty in Maine builds upon affective relationships of trust. This reasoning calls
for a built-in safety measure where communities filter the risks of food-borne illness for one
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another because of their shared bonds. As Sarah and David see it, regulations will never fix the
problem of food safety because sharing food with one another is such a basic form of human
interaction, despite its ‘risk.’ “You will always have such problems. Regardless if everyone is
licensed because they sell.” The point should not be to regulate our modes of sharing food at the
interpersonal level, but rather scale the regulation in common sensical ways—namely, the ways
that make the most sense for the community affected by them. To further push this point, David
makes the comparison to the commercial prepared-food industry: “it can happen to anybody at
any given time, anywhere. You go to Chipotle and they have all the fresh stuff and what
happened...there’s been more recalls on food from the commercial side of everything than there
ever has been from the raw milk people.”
In tension with this emphasis on trust lies the risk that ‘food safety’ advocates (most
notably the FDA) point to in the form of food borne illness. Significant risk exists for the smallscale producers who work within the towns that have passed ordinances. Referencing the case
against Dan Brown,325 Sarah and David suggest that, even if a town votes in an ordinance, it only
serves as a symbolic gesture: “it is still illegal, in spite of our ordinance, it still illegal to sell raw
milk [and] raw cheese.”
As a way to explain why they support the passage of a symbolic gesture, David suggests
that the ordinance has a twofold purpose: to give one standing in court should the state prosecute
them, and as an act of “civil disobedience…the concept is that someday somebody is going to
say something and the law is going to change.” An implicit goal remains that, someday, the state
will find itself ‘on the wrong side’ of a majority of Maine citizens.
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One can never eliminate the risk of food borne illness completely, but affective relations
of trust can serve as filters to mitigate this risk at the interpersonal level. “It’s a thing about
trust—you know the person, you know how they make it, and then you decide you want to buy
it.”326 Affective reasoning also connects to the sense that “it is the right thing to do.” Sarah
makes the link to civil disobedience explicit when she says: “this disobedience, it happens
always when the law is not right.”
For advocates, civil disobedience grows from the trust that we have with one another to
do right. Reconsidering this position through Arendt’s concern for propriety suggests that what is
improper is the way that the industrial food system discursively constructs trust. Industrial trust
is too blind for advocates of food sovereignty; they feel compelled to know their sources of food
in a tangible way.
Language in the ordinance signifies the ‘plasticity of the proper’ through its emphasis on
‘access.’ Although section 5.2 of the ordinance discusses the “Right to Access and Produce
Food,” the demand in question concerns the ability to benefit from closer proximity to food
production.327 Moving from a perspective that only considers rights (propriety and property) to
one that focuses on ability attends to the webs of “social relationships that can constrain or
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enable people to benefit from resources” instead of just focusing on property ownership.328
Indeed, the ordinance in Maine acts as a means by which landowners have access to, or the
ability to benefit from, their property. This perspective emphasizes how “access patterns change
over time; [hence] they must be understood as processes.”329 The ordinance brings this process
orientation to the fore; small-scale farming succeeds because of its ability to adapt to the needs of
the locality.
One advocate underscores this perspective in testimony for a public hearing by tracing
the emphasis on affect back to the Declaration of Independence:
‘But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same
Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right,
it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for
their future security.’330 Our new guards will be old ones that have existed since
long before our country has: our trust in one another, our ability to make our own
decisions, and our ways of nourishing each other that pre-date corporate
agriculture.331
Other advocates use similar language to emphasize the connections between community
members as the integral aspect of sovereign food production. To “cherish the connection,”332
communities value opportunities to know and understand the food production process. These
opportunities have so much value that communities need legislation to protect it, for “there is
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nothing more intimate than eating.”333 Two legislators testifying in support of food sovereignty
articulate how their support finds its motive in childhood experiences—as one put it: from “the
lessons I learned about governing from growing up on a farm…Plan for the future…You reap
what you sow…[and] we are all in this together.”334
I finish this theme on affect and this section on identification by returning to comments
made by Helen that synthesize concerns expressed by advocates relating to resiliency in response
to economic and ecological vulnerability335 and food sovereignty as a form of community reconnection. She also leads this discussion into the next section, which focuses on how advocates
in Maine construct a discourse around the pluralistic goals of increased access to the democratic
decision-making process.
Taking an active role in decision-making processes builds the capacity of small-farming
communities, but Helen suggests that this capacity addresses a need that emerges from
communities vulnerable to regulatory pressure. To relieve this pressure through ‘counter
pressure’ lessens community vulnerability.
This vulnerability is multifaceted, but stems from a lack of community engagement. She
references the current opioid addiction problems that many rural communities struggle with in
Maine and elsewhere in the country. She suggests that there is “a desperate need…[to] feel like
there are positive ways to engage in your own community” in order to know “that you’re not
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disconnected and you’re not seeking those things out.” As it relates to small-farmers as
community members, she recalls how, when she and her husband began farming, they practiced
“ostrich farming,” where they farmed with minimal political engagement. With the farm taking
precedence over everything else, the effect is that “your head’s in the sand and your tail’s in the
air and you’re actually really vulnerable” to the regulatory system.
Such vulnerability affects the non-farming community as well. The lack of public
engagement between farmers and non-farmers breaks down lines of communication, so that
people who supported…small farms had absolutely no idea…[that] most small
farms are there by a thread…then when [farmers] stop farming, the people that ate
from those farms never knew why. Why did they just disappear?...Where did they
go?
For Helen, the fear that this lack of engagement and loss of shared knowledge creates provides
the exigence for enacting municipal ordinances. The absence of strong local communities
presents an existential threat to small farms and traditions which the ordinances seek to preserve.
Lack of knowledge and engagement, however, is not the inevitable collateral damage of social
‘progress.’ Rather, it results from progressive regulatory reform that accelerates the
consolidation of smaller farms and modes of production into larger farms and more extensive,
extractive modes of production.
Consolidation, accelerated by the industrial regulatory structure, catalyzes advocates of
food sovereignty in Maine. In forming a coherent community, they identify around three
principal themes, including a necessarily broad conception of sovereignty, a rejection of the
appearance of political corruption, and the potency of affective relations, specifically that of
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trust. The next section builds off how advocates use their identification with food sovereignty to
construct an alternative discourse to that of industrial food production.
Discursive Construction of Food Sovereignty: Subjugation and Access
The ways advocates identify with the principles of food sovereignty develop a
‘constitutive’ rhetoric and materialize in the testimonies and texts of the community. These
events interrupt the industrial food system’s discourse, specifically as it relates to food safety,
and emphasize how such a system subjugates their patterns of experience and collective
knowledge about food production.336
In discussing this subjugation, I begin to refer to these patterns of experience as
‘agrarian.’337 Agrarian knowledge has fundamentally transformed under ‘international food
regimes’338 from a central cultural component for many people around the world to a
marginalized and, in the case of Maine, an increasingly rare emblem of a ‘regressive’ past. In
advocating for “traditional foodways,”339 food sovereignty troubles the assumption that technical
innovation leads inexorably to social progress. Advocates do not oppose agricultural
regulation,340 but suspect that ‘progress’ is a euphemism for corporate control of the food system.
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This perception speaks volumes to the rhetorical sensibilities of advocates. For smallscale farmers, the discourse of industrial food production performs metonymic reductions341 of
what it means to farm.342 In other words, industrial agriculture’s discourse “conveys some
incorporeal or intangible state in terms of the corporeal or tangible.”343 Regional dynamics
become obstacles to industry goals of standardization, homogenization, and commodification. In
response to this, food sovereignty’s discourse articulates the intangible344 values associated with
small-scale agriculture that no amount of facilities requirements or licensing can reproduce. This
discursive move points to the subjugation of such values and how communities need them to
secure their health, safety, and welfare.
In the following analysis, I explore how food sovereignty’s discourse functions in a
tactical way as opposed to a strategic way. I rely on Michel de Certeau’s distinction between
tactics and strategies,345 specifically looking at how tactics do not identify with “the law of the
place,”346 but rather cut across the public and private spheres through use, manipulation, and
diversion of these places. In contrast to the metonymic reduction of the industrial discourse, food
sovereignty’s discourse and agrarian values “metaphorize the dominant order” and make it
“function in another register.”347 By focusing on sovereignty, however, this discourse analyzes

“…we’re not against regulation; we’re for right-sized regulation…somebody needs to be watching
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the inequalities of power in Maine’s agricultural sector not through a metaphorical frame of war,
but through one of contract.
Foucault describes such an analysis as “juridical,”348 or how sovereignty remains
enmeshed in a matrix of political power that defines it in terms of legitimacy and illegitimacy
rather than submission or repression. In food sovereignty’s discourse, the state, through its
corporately-influenced regulatory enforcement, breaks the social contract as laid out in the U.S.
and Maine state constitutions. Thus, food sovereignty uses constitutive rhetoric to pick up the
pieces and recompose rural society in line with agrarian values.349
Food sovereignty’s discourse also draws attention to farms and their place in local food
systems as one where state power is exercised to the detriment of the community. To
conceptualize this, I draw on Foucault’s idea of ‘subjugated knowledges’ as being particular yet
central to the formation of local critiques of the exercise of state power as consisting of
“disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges…naïve [and] hierarchically inferior” to the erudite
and scientific discourse that the state requires.350
The systematization of difference characteristic of a bureaucratic regulatory scheme
masks the endemic differences of small-scale farming communities and renders illegitimate their
appeals for recognition by the state apparatus. Food sovereignty attempts to transorm this official
illegitimacy by honing a critical set of tactics that “struggle against the coercion of a unitary,
formal, and scientific theoretical discourse.”351 Following the discursive eruptions of this
struggle takes me over the contested terrain of contemporary agricultural discourse and
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highlights the boundaries of two primary “terministic screens”:352 that of scientific, industrial
food production and its homogeneous regulatory goals and that of poetic self-governance, where
food sovereignty turns towards intangible values rather than towards tangible, measurable, and
easily-controlled values of economic legitimacy.
The farm becomes a site of struggle that demands a ‘radical investment’ of affect to
succeed. Discursive construction of such struggle, however, brings to the fore tensions between
conventions of public and private spaces. Farms become sources of public good yet remain
private property and, often, private businesses. To negotiate these distinctions into a cohesive
discourse, food sovereignty focuses on access to the decision-making process as what the
industrial food system controls.
Theoretically, pitting the metonymy of industrial food discourse against the metaphorical
discourse of food sovereignty creates a convenient dichotomy.353 Practically, however, the
discourses interact in dialectical ways that do not always align with the rhetorical categories I
place them in here. Metaphor slips into metonymy and vice versa, depending on the situation.
The crafting of municipal ordinances that constitute food sovereignty present an example
of such slippery rhetorical boundaries. As noted in the section one of this chapter, ‘constitutive’
rhetoric has purposeful vagueness that enables future interpreters the flexibility to relate the text
to current conditions. Constitutive rhetoric emphasizes the principles and values that
communities use as a guide to address problems as they arise. The municipal ordinances, as
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examples of this, work to “establish a principle of inviting citizens to interpret and debate… [to]
a freedom to shape themselves through creatively grounded interpretive and rhetorical
processes.”354 Creativity defines food sovereignty’s discourse, both within and without the
ordinances, and by focusing on access to regulatory decision-making uses this creativity to open
up public interpretation of what it means to farm legitimately in Maine.
The first theme is that of perceived systemic or structural bias, perpetuated through the
regulatory structure. This perception of bias that subjugates the agrarian practices that contribute
to the discourse of food sovereignty. Small-scale farms become “site[s] of engagement”355
between the state and communities, exposing the imbalance of power and the lack of popular
access to the regulatory process.
Conceptually, the corporate-state’s power over the small farmer “occurs in the
interstice…the pure distance which indicates that the adversaries do not belong to a common
space.”356 ‘Common space,’ for the state, does not refer to the home, but to the landscape of
industrialized food production and the regulatory system that sets standards to comply with
industry, not the other way around. The interstice of industrialized food landscapes occurs on the
small farm that cannot afford or wishes not to comply with regulatory fees and, therefore, finds
its farming practice—its ways of knowing and inherited knowledges—under threat and out of
place. Placement here is arbitrary and a function of the state’s “distribution of the sensible,”
whereby the designation of ‘commonness’ also denotes uncommonness, or exclusion.357
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Excluding small-scale farming from common places results in losing the intangible
values associated with small-scale farming that the interviewees, testimony, and texts of food
sovereignty articulate. Food sovereignty’s discourse seeks to protect these values by
recomposing the legal landscape of agriculture. First, however, it defines the discourse of
industrial food production as aggressively hegemonic, enforcing the loss of defining community
values. Such losses alter the relationship between state regulatory agencies and farmers into one
of oppression: one-size-fits-all agricultural regulations create “non-places” for small-scale
farmers while, conversely, placing corporations everywhere.358
Systemic bias has its most detrimental effects in terms of political access for communities
and accountability on the part of legislators and state agents. In terms of social resiliency, this
industry-government infrastructure remains “brittle” and prone to repeated and dangerous
breakdowns.359 This instability acts as a motive for advocates to reconceive community food
systems as a means to a more pluralist and responsible society. For example, Harold references
subsidies for corporate business as a growing risk with the prospect of unpredictable
environmental change. Continuing to pursue fossil fuels relies on such financial support; to
question it questions the economic foundation of our culture. And yet, such questioning remains
a conceptual motive for food sovereignty:
There are larger principles that need to be addressed and common interests across
groups, nationwide and, ultimately, the world as well…They [policy makers] can
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either make it a disincentive for people to [pursue alternatives], or they can make
it an incentive, and nobody is asking those big questions.
One consequence of structural bias results in the loss of accountability policy makers
have to the general public. This loss acts as a displacement of identity at the community level.
Representation in government, while ostensibly borne out of a synecdochic360 process whereby
the interests of regional constituencies condense into a single voice of the political
representative, now also competes with interests of businesses and lobbying associations that
represent wealthy constituencies whose influence crosses state boundaries.
Harold presents an example of this moneyed interest influencing the regulatory process in
describing how legislation containing food sovereignty language has been prevented from
passage into law because of seemingly manufactured concerns that align with industry
interests.361 During review in the appropriations committee, the department of agriculture argued
that they would “have to hire one or two new inspectors to implement” the bill. The problem
with such a response, for Harold, is that in food sovereignty, the accountability and inspection
(i.e. the costs the committee associated with new hiring) remains embedded within the
community.
This interpretive gap between the state and advocates as to what accountability means
and how to implement it speaks to the transformative aspirations of the discourse. In a food
system predicated on anonymity and mass production, rules for accountability depend on a “very
elaborate structure of transportation and handling” as a sort of insurance against risk “rather than
the trust and knowledge” that constitutes community connections.

360
361

Burke, Grammar, 507.
This is a reference to LD 783, from 2015.

100

Thus, how to work within a regulatory system that develops in biased ways represents a
principal struggle for food sovereignty in Maine. A sense of urgency exists in response to the
perceived redefinition of what it is that farming means for society:
what appears to be happening writ large, in terms of corporations having way
more of a role than politicians or the people and that the corporations are defining
new centers of power and hegemony that are different from nation-states. How do
you access them?
Jeff offers a possible answer to this question and suggests that codifying small-scale, “micro
enterprise development” suggests way to work within a corporate regulatory structure. This
claim has, as its basis, the perspective of sovereignty as closely linked to regenerative or resilient
modes of social organization. Jeff emphasizes this goal of stability by contrasting industrial and
small-scale food production practices:
large-scale, concentrated food production in the hands of a few who have these
large-scale, capital-intensive production operations [is]…very brittle from a
macro-cosmic perspective because it is capital-intensive, it is energyintensive…We have this capital-intensive, energy-intensive infrastructure…[and]
forms of production that we assume should be the way everyone should operate.
And that is a flaw in our imagination, I think.
Here, Jeff suggests that a brittle infrastructure produces brittle assumptions about
how people should live, about propriety and collective expectations. Change, in order to
adapt and gain resilience in the face of heightened environmental risks, must be systemic.
Drafting small-scale (municipal) and distributed legislation finds its parallel in the
distributed means of production that it seeks to “enshrine.”
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This move towards local legislation responds to the perceived threat from federal
and state governments. The process of political representation seems disrupted, with
representatives responding more readily to wealthy interests than to the majority of their
constituents. Rather than waiting for the process to include local constituencies, these
constituencies have begun a new and different process in the form of writing grassroots
legislation. Building a more stable collective infrastructure focuses on redefining the
pursuits of regulation. Food sovereignty ordinances serve as “an affirmation of a right,”
namely the “right to grow and sell food,”362 instead of assuming humans to have a
destructive relations with the world.
Barbara, a community member, avid supporter and consumer of local food, and a lead
organizer for food sovereignty in Maine, articulates how the ordinance begins this redefinition.
In her articulation of a “triangle of doom”—consisting of federal agencies, state departments,
and corporate industry—she approaches the interactions between the state and small farmers in
terms of the tactical advantages gained by one side or the other. This perspective contextualizes
the following two themes in this section as forming a political landscape in Maine that
disadvantages small farming communities and the traditions that food sovereignty hopes to
maintain.
As an example of this, she summarizes a highly-publicized legal case that came before
the Maine Supreme Court in the fall of 2011 and pitted the state of Maine against a farmer that
sold raw milk from a single cow.363 This case is the only one to date that has addressed the
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municipal ordinances directly in terms of their legal logic. While the ruling led to the defendant
having to end his sales of raw milk, the Supreme Court avoided ruling against Maine’s ‘home
rule’ law,364 which forms the basis of the ordinance’s goals “to carve out zones of protection” for
small farmers. By avoiding a ruling against the home rule clause, the court, according to Barbara,
“made a tactical error.” The focus on a single farmer who worked at such a small scale seemed
like a form of bullying that rubbed many people the wrong way. This public perception led to
increased scrutiny of the state’s case against the farmer—scrutiny that undermined the state’s
credibility. Claims about the high bacteria count seemed hyperbolic, given the fact that people
drink raw milk in order to ingest higher amounts of bacteria seemed lost on the state.
Ostensibly, the state’s concern regarded food safety. While a consistent argument against
food sovereignty, Barbara suggests that the state unevenly applies this concern across different
jurisdictions in the regulatory structure. For example, she questions the sincerity of food safety
concerns when elsewhere in the food industry there seems a disturbing disregard for food safety.
“Prophylactic use of antibiotics” in meat production are necessary only to maintain the
dangerously unsanitary conditions that many animals are raised in. If this practice was banned,
Barbara suggests, it “would eliminate the whole CAFO system because you can’t raise animals
that close together without feeding them full of antibiotics.”
In terms of rhetorical effects, such policies erode trust in the regulatory system to actually
keep consumers safe. The notion of “food safety” sounds more like a ruse to advantage largescale, corporate farming operations that can afford regulatory costs that price out smaller-scale
farms. For the skeptical consumer, rather than government regulating the agricultural industry, it
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appears more like “governmental catering to the corporations” at the expense of small farming
communities.
Tactically, these same communities in Maine try to exploit these perceptions of “the
triangle of doom,” consisting of federal agencies, state departments, and corporate industry. One
example of this focuses on constructing the sense of a systemic assault on small-scale farming
communities that emanates from the federal government. Food sovereignty in Maine emerged
out from under the pressure to conform to new governmental regulation that sought to expand
the federal field of jurisdiction. “The FDA came down on Maine because they weren’t in
conformance with their regulations”365 as they related to direct sales between farmers and their
customers.
Historically, “there’s [been] no relationship between the state and farmers doing direct
sales to their customers,”366 but the increased pressure led to regulatory changes that have
redefined the modes of production for small farms. For example, the state “redefined dairy
farmers as milk distributors,”367 regardless of how they produced milk or how much they
actually sold or how they actually distributed the milk. Small farmers that sold on-farm to
neighbors were designated as ‘milk distributors’ and thus subject to regulations such as
refurbishing barns with concrete floors and purchasing expensive processing equipment. Rather
than increasing food safety, the effect of this pressure has been to make it harder for small
farmers to serve their communities.
Food sovereignty advocates incorporate this community-mindedness into their rhetoric.
The municipal ordinances have appropriated language from legislation elsewhere in the state or
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the country to further the goals of communities in Maine.368 For example, Barbara explains how
the ordinance uses “right to farm’ language, which is generally something used by…corporate
farms.” Combining this appropriated language with knowledge of legal theory enables advocates
to present arguments that the state and industry have been unable to overturn in court.369 Barbara
even suggests that state and federal laws frustrate the purposes of each other, and that the
language of food sovereignty remains faithful to the intent of the state’s department of
conservation, agriculture, and forestry.370
The only way for the state to prevent the municipal ordinances from taking effect is to
show that the ordinance ‘frustrates the purpose of state law.’371 However, she points out that in
the law establishing the state department of conservation, agriculture, and forestry, language is
included that “specifically says that the purpose of the establishment of the department is to
protect small family farms and rural communities.” The tactical rhetoric of the food sovereignty
discourse in Maine has deftly appropriated language to recompose the legal landscape of
agriculture in response to the redefinition of agricultural modes of production by state and
federal governments.
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This tactical use of language, ensuring that the language used by advocates agrees with
the stated purposes of state law, exposes the bias of the regulatory structure in favor of
corporations. The common rebuttal to food sovereignty in the state legislature and at town
meetings is that food safety is paramount. But I highlight how the patterns of experience for
advocates do not align with this purported concern for safety.
As a city councilor advocating for passage of an ordinance, Renee tries to understand
“what people are afraid of.” Ironically, the concern, above all, seems to be food safety, even
though the same system that produces the type of contamination seen in North Carolina is
perceived as being safer than the small-scale production model that food sovereignty seeks.
This irony derives from the discursive construction of food-borne illness as a ‘disorder’
within the industrial food system. The ‘disorderliness’ resides within the product itself (food) as
opposed to within the production process. Hence, all the regulatory measures conceived of to
control the mode of production have as a goal an ‘orderly’ or ‘clean’ product.
Health is referred to in terms of cleanliness, or the negation of ‘impurities.’ The
legislative testimony of various advocates of food sovereignty echoes such a sentiment. For
example, citizens argue that the right to food is a “fundamental right,” the prevention of which is
analogous to other violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in the fourteenth
amendment.372 To use this frame in food sovereignty’s discourse suggests that industrial food
discourse considers unlicensed food products as violating “the orderly pursuit of happiness by
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free men.”373 For advocates who farm or consume small farm products, it is as though their
products “are treated as if they fall into some bio-hazard category.”374
One aspect of this discursive ‘disorder’ has an effect of intimidation on small-scale
producers by redefining them as criminally non-compliant. Several citizens testify to this by
saying that increasingly stringent regulations will “turn us into outlaws.”375 One advocate even
calls their homemade candies “Criminal Caramels” because they make them “in an unlicensed,
uninspected kitchen…[and] use…lard from our own healthy pigs.”376 Instead of a regulatory
framework that discursively transforms artisanal and small-scale food production into criminal
acts, advocates claim that Maine “would be better served if our Attorney General was pressuring
the DOJ to prosecute Dean Foods, DFA, and National Milk Holdings” in order to “protect Maine
farmer from corruption, unfair market forces, and an unfounded public health campaign against
unpasteurized milk.” Such redefinition would “keep us from becoming criminals for doing what
we do, growing what we grow, selling what we sell and honoring the agrarian tradition of
Maine.”377 The regulatory structure only addresses the symptoms of its own defined practices.
If regulators wish to ensure safe food, then the entire frame of food safety needs to
change. The discourse of food sovereignty produces new frames with which to perceive food
safety not as something that can “‘legislate’ a disorder out of existence,”378 but rather as
something endemic to food production, not particular actors. The industrial discursive frame of
‘food safety’ operates as a legislative remedy to the ‘disorder’ of food-borne illness.
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Food sovereignty seeks an injunction here to redefine and re-frame mass food-borne
illness as a symptom of the industrial system, not rooted in food production that occurs in
unlicensed facilities. In this sense, the discourse of food sovereignty warns against the use of
legislation in the name of ‘food safety’ as something “hardly more than a kind of public
prayer.”379 Regulators and the industry focus on the product rather than the process as that which
needs to be controlled and, in so doing, offer no opportunity to actually address the causes of
unsafe food.
Renee refers to this product-oriented regulation as “the guise of safety,” a guise that can
filter public health disasters such as the flooding in North Carolina as unfortunate but ephemeral
‘accidents’ as opposed to an ever present risk latent in the industrial food system. The discourse
of food sovereignty tries to invert this narrative, claiming as Renee does that:
the danger from food is actually coming from the industrial food business. You
can’t buy chickens at the local supermarket that are not covered in e-coli…you
don’t see that on small farms. You see that when you have ten chickens crammed
into a cage…because the only way you can grow food under those conditions is to
supplement with huge amounts of antibiotics. Now we are developing bacteria
that are resistant to that…we are in danger now from corporate farming.
The point should never be to try and eradicate the risk, but rather to actively work with it and
even include it within our arbitrary definitions of ‘healthy’ communities. In other words, our
symbolic action should include the bacteriological substance that necessarily composes part of
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our world, for it would be disingenuous to do otherwise. We cannot escape this; let us not delude
ourselves in the pursuit for purity.380
An example of the consequences of this pursuit appear in the case of Lisa, a micro-dairy
farmer who, at one point, repeatedly attempted to get licensed in order to sell a fermented bean
product. Despite having “followed their rules exactly… [and being] legal to the letter of the
law,” the state department of agriculture repeatedly denied her a license to sell fermented bean
dip at a local grocery store.
Even though Lisa certified her home kitchen according to the state specifications, she
learned that “the kitchen regulations that are posted by the state do not agree at all with the hoops
they make you go through.” The structural bias of the regulatory apparatus manifests in this
discrepancy between the rules and her experience, but perhaps is most telling in how the state
responded to her requests for clarity as to the ineligibility of her product. The state denied her
application twice, each time returning the form with only a sticky note attached with little to no
explanation as to why they refused her license: “It [went] round and round and round…nobody
signed it, nobody dated it, nothing official. No refusal letter, no explanation why.”
The bias became a little clearer after a phone call with a department representative who
told Lisa that “you can’t mess with beans because they’re a protein food. Regardless if your end
product passes all the tests with flying colors. [Therefore, suggesting] that’s irrelevant.” Her
experience suggests an implicit bias against foods containing protein, or as she puts it, against
nutritious food.
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I got the impression they were telling me over and over ‘you can make cakes and
cookies as long as you don’t put butter in them. You have to put Crisco [in],
which is heart-attack city…as long as you make a totally safe food full of sugar,
we’ll okay it. My impression was nothing nutritious because nutrition will support
bacterial growth as it will support all growth—including humans. You can’t do
that in a certified home kitchen.
Such a reality severely limits what small-scale producers can produce to foodstuffs that
have little nutritious value. In turn, this discursive construction of the food system forces people
to seek out ‘nutritious’ foods in the supermarket, or the purveyor of industrially-processed foods.
A principle grievance of food sovereignty in Maine, as Lisa’s experience makes clear, is
the bind between producing and consuming healthy foods and gaining legitimacy under the
current regulatory structure. This structure does not encourage the consumption of healthy
foods—it does quite the opposite in order to normalize and systematize the production of edible
foods on a mass scale. The quality of the food product seems less ‘relevant’ than its
reproducibility at the expense of nutrition. This points to a process of homogenization occurring
at all levels of food production and consumption: monocultural growing conditions, processing
conditions, and homogeneous choice at the check-out. Small growers like Lisa who transgress
these pressures to normalize are classified as deviant and suffer the consequences.
The systemic bias of agricultural regulation discursively construes small-scale farming as
‘disorderly’ or unsanitary. This definition leads to, in the discourse of food sovereignty,
unreasonable situations where the lifestyles that advocates follow appear as a threat to the
dominant mode of industrial farming. Emerging out of a tension between different value
systems, food sovereignty’s discourse goes on to point out the next theme in this section, that of
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‘disappearing’ rural traditions. ‘Disappearance’ calls attention to the implicit notions of propriety
produced through discourse and how these arbitrary definitions come to shape social norms. I
discuss how, as an attempt to gain visibility, food sovereignty in Maine redefines what things its
members share in common as having value.
In Maine, the homogeneous values of industrial food discourse create tension with the
heterogeneous values at the center of food sovereignty’s discourse. Several advocates describe
the results of this tension as a sort of “disappearance” of small-scale farms from the rural
landscape. By doing so, they guide this conceptual movement from the metaphor of ‘guise’ to
the metaphor of ‘disappearance.’ Notions of visibility emerge with advocates arguing that
legitimacy, at the state level, comes through recognition by the state. Becoming visible, however,
is nearly impossible when the regulatory scheme defines your livelihood as illegitimate.
this is what happens as—if you want to call it [this]—a movement goes forward
that the principles go forward, but the experiences that generated it in the first
place don’t always translate.
This quote from Helen discusses the frustration she feels when people in positions of
authority suggest that her advocacy constitutes an ‘unnecessary’ set of demands or “somehow
make it seem like it is not real, like what we are experiencing is not real.” In this she makes
connections between the sense of ‘being real’ and being ‘seen’ by the state, or those with
authority. The illegitimacy of many small-scale farms, while a legal sort of designation, gains its
‘reality’ from a small farm’s inability to appear in a public way. Helen distinctly connects this
illegitimacy with the senses that accompany the small farmer in public. Not only does she
suggest that some legislators simply “didn’t hear us,” but also that:
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what is not being recognized…is the invisible nature of all the farms that those
rules have disappeared. Or those that just aren’t going to begin. Or those of us that
are doing it in every way, I think, legitimately, but aren’t recognized by the state
as being ‘legitimate’ farmers if we don’t have a license.
Arendt writes about the public sphere as the ‘space of appearance,’381 and food
sovereignty in Maine experiences a version of this. While the small-scale farmer achieves some
form of legitimation by selling at farmers markets or at a local grocery store, legitimacy in the
eyes of the state entails more for Helen. It includes a sense of knowing that your way of life is
safe. There comes a sense of protection, that small, unlicensed farming has a level of social
acceptance that the government acknowledges its place in the public sphere. It is not enough that
some officials and most residents of the state of Maine “know that it is happening all the time;”
places need protection for the assurance that these ‘traditional foodways’ can continue. Another
way to conceive of such protection is as an “investment” of authority in the municipalities
passing the ordinances.
Municipal authority offers a level of governance that all Maine residents can share in
common to exert the power of redefinition alluded to above when discussing discursive frames.
Redefinition occurs at the farm level as well as the level of on-farm activity or process.
Advocates seek to replace authority for these definitions in the smallest scale of government, the
municipality, where rules can be made by those who know the local conditions that affect how
the rules come to bear on the community. The legal definition of ‘small farm’ is a central feature
of what Barbara calls “regulatory capture,” or the discursive redefining of what legitimate
farming means.
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At the federal level, ‘small farm’ means something at a completely different and much
larger scale than for all but the largest of Maine farms. As Barbara explains, in the FSMA,382
“their definition of small farms was that…you’re selling within a 500-mile radius. That would
have our farmers selling in Newark, NJ…that is their definition of a small farm. Well, that is
completely irrelevant…to what we’re doing.” Thus, a primary concern for food sovereignty in
Maine concerns the appropriate scaling of regulation, according to the local definition of ‘small
farm’ and the different pace of small-scale farming.383
With laws like FSMA, it feels like these lines extend too far. Such regulatory discourses
of discipline limit the possible selection of means for farmers to practice their trade. Scholars
note such limits have paradoxical effects of enabling ‘alternative’ choices such as organic foods
while encouraging the consolidation of agriculture into norms informed by the interests of
‘agribusiness.’384 The appearance of choice obscures the reality of agricultural codification that
aligns with industrial practices, thereby further naturalizing the processes of legitimation that
form the legal landscape for farmers at any scale.385 Regulation, here, assumes a literal role of
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making the farm a regular phenomenon, a predictable set of practices that precludes ‘othered’
practices that cannot comply with the instated norms.
Identifying what small farming communities in Maine hold in common emerges as a
rhetorical tactic used by advocates to address this process of redefinition. Barbara demonstrates
this when speaking of the “common” things that happen in rural Maine towns. Church suppers,
bake sales, and other types of fundraisers that include the selling of home-made food represent a
mode of community organizing food sovereignty both wants to protect and to point out come
under threat from invasive regulations. The rhetorical move occurs through making these types
of events equivalent (in terms of a regulatory category) with direct sales of food between farmers
and consumers. In making this move, food sovereignty in Maine performs a metonymic
comparison between the largely public gatherings that communities have maintained and the
private transactions of local businesses (farms).
Eliding the public and the private in this way influences how to analyze the rhetoric of
food sovereignty in Maine. Barbara and others repeatedly refer to the “disappearing” effect that
the current regulatory structure has on small farms. In light of the equivalential logic that
connects church suppers with the face-to-face transactions that occur on farms and at farmers
markets, the implicit understanding is that these community events, too, potentially face
regulatory scrutiny if ‘we’ do not respond.
That which occurs ‘in public’ enters, in Arendt’s terms, the ‘space of appearance.’ The
public realm and the audience it implies enables communities to perform acts in common and to
which, over time, they can refer as though these common things have more permanence than life
itself. Arendt speaks explicitly of government as this ‘common thing,’ but the analogy applies
well to this example of communities coming together to share food. Indeed, the food sovereignty
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community in Maine exercises their right to self-governance by instituting social principles at the
municipal level in the form of an ordinance. These principles act as ‘things,’ assembling us
together, bringing us closer to create collective, shared meaning by defining rights and
obligations grounded in agrarian patterns of experience.386
To then include the direct sales of private business within this category of public event
makes a claim about the act of small-farming in these communities. In such a perspective, smallscale farming performs a public role. It appears as a formative practice to community identity
and, as such, becomes a matter of public concern. Such metonymy, however, slips into irony
when one considers that, as Barbara claims, the private interests of corporations drive the
formation of public sector regulation. Thus, food sovereignty’s discourse makes a sophisticated
argument—that public spaces (i.e. farms in rural communities) are incompatible with the private
interests supported by the federal and state regulatory structure. The ostensible concern of the
agency is public food safety; the effect, however, is to endanger the public good.
In addition to bringing farms into the space of public appearance, the discourse of food
sovereignty also attends to the disappearance of traditions as a common thing under threat from
industrial food production. Consumers play a key role in maintaining agrarian traditions in
Maine, a reality that advocates want to grow to apply counter-pressure on the state legislature
and regulatory apparatus to relieve the structural bias the industrial discourse creates.
As a way to address this structural inequality for growers, Lisa addresses the
responsibility of consumers to apply counter-pressure on the regulatory environment by
supporting local, and possibly unlicensed, growers. She points to the ordinance itself as a
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commonly misinterpreted form of protection for farmers alone. Rather, “the whole ordinance…is
designed to protect the consumer’s right to have access to the foods that these people grow.”
The ordinance, for Lisa, needs to be understood as an argument for “consumers’ rights.”
Again, this links to the notion of community events that play a pivotal role in the life of any rural
community—church suppers, for example. In assuming more responsibility for their influence
over the food system, consumers must shed the sense of privilege that comes with the relative
ease of finding food within it.
She suggests that it is a matter of paying more attention to the “things where people are.”
Attending to our common things builds collective capacity for affection—for trust and shared
knowledge in how we produce food and especially how we consume it. Culturally, this
acknowledges that we cannot “just take it for granted that we’ll always be able to feed each other
what we want.” Maintaining our local food systems, while possibly sacrificing some
convenience, allows communities to hold both each other and the industrial food system
accountable. A dialectical relationship around food can form, where the mutual dependence
between producers and consumers focuses our attention on how we all contribute to our common
‘foodways’ and how these contributions have consequences.
Advocates express similar sentiment in testimony by saying, for example, that “[t]he best
regulators of local butchering facilities are the customers, not the government.” 387 In the
discourse of food sovereignty, consumers have a lot of leverage to effect change. Industrial food
discourse, as exercised through regulatory agencies, does not extend such power to the
consumer. As mentioned earlier, regulatory concern focuses almost exclusively on the product
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and individual producer as that which needs control. As a result, the overdetermination of food
safety constrains the capacity for creative food regulation that accounts for local dynamics.
As a response to the claims that consumers should act as the arbiters of food safety,
Maine’s director of Quality Assurance and Regulations (QAR) deploys standard industry
discourse, framing the discussion in terms of the state enabling progress and exercising
‘tolerance’ of deviant agrarian practices:
To be of maximum benefit to these small Maine agricultural businesses, state
regulators need to be viewed as a technical advisor partner and not an impediment
to progress…Custom slaughterhouses who are seeking less oversight must be
willing to assume zero tolerance for insanitary conditions, food contamination and
any other food safety infractions in order to protect the health of their
customers.388
The discrepancy between the industrial and food sovereignty discourses manifests in this
quote in that advocates already assume a “zero tolerance” policy from their customers. Returning
to the idea of ‘constitutions’ as heuristics that lead us to ask certain questions, food sovereignty
does not ask the question, ‘how many corners can I cut to keep my business afloat,’ but rather, in
the words of an advocate, “What’s the relative risk between buying something from my neighbor
versus buying something from a large, national agricultural company that is sourcing food from a
variety of places?”389 Additional questions posed from food sovereignty to the above statement
might read: “what constitutes ‘insanitary conditions’ and ‘safety infractions,’ and ‘to what
agricultural practices are they addressed?’ Again, the industrial discourse relies on metonymic
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reductions—in this case, the use of euphemistic designations for a vague concept of food
safety—for it means to farm as a way to exercise power.
Consumers and the affective connections they form with food producers form a major
component of food sovereignty’s discourse. To conclude this section on the discursive
construction of food sovereignty, I include a brief anecdote of when the first ordinance passed in
the town of Sedgwick to demonstrate how a primary motive for advocates is to maintain the
ability of community traditions to be seen. Barbara emphasizes the threat felt by communities to
their traditional ways of living because of the dominant industrial food discourse. I conceive of
this as another mode of effective tactical rhetoric, one that constructs again a sense of
vulnerability in the community in order to build capacity for self-protection in the form of the
municipal ordinance.
In discussing the town meeting in which the first ordinance passed, Barbara describes
how community members framed the vote as whether or not the town of Sedgwick wanted to
preserve their way of life. For example, one supporter of the ordinance
stood up and…turned around and pointed to the table in the back of the room
where the seventh graders were selling baked goods to raise money for their
eighth grade class trip and…said if we don’t pass this, that could go away. And
then somebody said, well what about church suppers? And he said ‘yeah those
could go away, too.’ And you could literally hear the gasp around the room.
The vote passed unanimously soon after this exchange. Tactically, such rhetoric appeals to the
affective connections that sustain any local community. Such mundane events as church suppers
or cookie sales constitute the traditions of small-scale farming communities as much as the direct
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sales of milk and meat between neighbors. Barbara draws attention to the demonstrable effect of
this example, stating deictically that “this is rural Maine—to be able to do these things.”
Rhetorically, the tactics of food sovereignty’s discourse in Maine appeal to the traditions
and agricultural memory of rural communities still existing in the state, and how these affective
connections to place resonate in the political sphere.390 Advocates construct this discourse
through a tactical rhetoric that brings small-scale farming into the ‘space of appearance.’ To do
so, they articulate how their alternative (though traditional) methods of farming suffer from a
systemic bias that advantages industrial modes of food production. In the next section, I analyze
how this discourse manages to influence the political landscape in the state and begin the process
of composing an alterity of belonging.
Political Conditioning
The tactics of food sovereignty’s discourse in Maine enable the affective community
connections to dictate how the discourse develops and what events it selects as disruptive of the
dominant industrial food discourse. They also create metaphorical openings for re-composing
what it means to farm going forward in time. Namely, the spatial metaphors391 that dominate in
the discursive construction of industrial food are tactically disrupted, enabling a consideration of
time as well. De Certeau suggests that “tactics are procedures that gain validity in relation to the
pertinence they lend to time,” through the advantages gained by intervening at the right moment
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and thus re-organizing the spaces governed by a dominant strategy.392 Similarly, food
sovereignty builds its discourse through rhetorical events such as legislative testimony, bills, and
texts such as the Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance.
In this final section of analysis, I stress how the “evental”393 quality to food sovereignty’s
rhetoric creates democratic dynamics by opening food system discourse to incorporate temporal
metaphors. By opening the discourse in this way, advocates for food sovereignty further subvert
the chronological discourse of administrative and bureaucratic power that privileges and
promotes a teleology of ‘progress.’ A ‘kairotic’ discourse builds off the sense of imposed
impropriety at the hands of the regulatory structure and informs legislation that is at once
appropriate and informal.394
Appropriate and informal legislation such as the municipal ordinances re-conditions the
political landscape of food systems and food safety by attending to the dynamic episteme of local
food production unfolding around kitchen tables rather than in laboratories. Furthermore, this
legislation has the potential to strengthen community resilience through better collective
management of public goods. By ‘public goods,’ I refer not only to locally sourced food, but also
the traditions and political power that accompany resource systems with, in the words of one
food sovereignty advocate, “tight feedback loops.”395
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‘Public goods’ also refer to situations where, as Elinor Ostrom demonstrates,
“appropriation problems do not exist, because resource units are not subtractable.”396 For food
sovereignty in Maine, small farms act as the indispensable resource units that communities rely
on for identifying with their agrarian heritage. Therefore, this section will focus on key demands
of the discourse that constitute it as a system of public goods management.
Sovereignty remains central to how advocates recondition the political dynamics of
Maine, specifically when attending to the ways in which it focuses on the collective decisionmaking process. ‘Collective,’ here, is key when considering how sovereignty addresses the
relationships of power that form between multiple subjects.
In relationships of power, subjects emerge from the way power directs their behavior;
“power is exercised through networks…[it] passes through individuals. It is not applied to
them.”397 The ‘juridical’ or administrative form of state power in terms of agricultural regulation
enforcement forms one such network of power. My concern with articulating sovereignty’s
theoretical significance here lies in how this power “displaces”398 the small-scale farmer through
a process of appropriating public ‘goods’ such as agrarian value systems that have long guided
rural livelihoods in Maine. Such networked power can be considered a “discourse of discipline,”
or a hegemonic arrangement of collective practices that “define[s] a code of normalization."399
Sovereignty assumes that power moves between people in reciprocal ways and food sovereignty
seeks to disrupt and redirect this movement by generating a resistant discourse.
In reconditioning the political landscape in Maine, food sovereignty redirects the flow of
sovereignty in the effort to acknowledge that “problems, motivation, fairness, and preferences
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play an important role” when addressing “collective-action problems” like sustaining small rural
economies.400 The affective connections stressed earlier again emerge as key contributions to the
trust that “can act as a heuristic guiding the choice among alternative norms”401 and enable more
reciprocity as a result.
Access to the Decision-Making Process
The principal demand is that of increasing community access to the decision-making
process for agricultural regulations. Such a demand forms the basis to an appeal for a pluralistic
democracy that can adapt its form to social spaces.402 Democratic adaptation to space requires
aptitude for understanding when to demand access. Food sovereignty demands access at this
point in time because of the increasing pressure from the federal level to regulate agricultural
production in a homogeneous way.403
‘Access,’ here, refers more to the process of or “ability to benefit from things” rather than
focusing exclusively on rights, which can often direct attention towards a discourse of property
ownership rather than the social relationships that I claim food sovereignty centers around.404 In
this conception, food sovereignty’s access to decision-making is relational and always subject to
change, depending on the positions and powers of the group.405 In this sense, the call for access
and a right to food of one’s own choosing is never made in isolation, but only in relation to how
food sovereignty’s “subject position”406—whether as a group or as individual advocates—is
defined by the social relationships that constitute it. The democratic rights that this discourse
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calls for must be realized collectively. As discussed earlier, the elements for such a collective
effort are in place with the dual emphasis placed by advocates on producers and consumers alike.
Helen strongly advocates for participation in the process not only as a citizen but also as
a producer, emphasizing this process as the source of power to claim space within one’s own
town. With the food sovereignty ordinance, this happens to focus on food production as the
process in which municipalities want to participate in, but Helen claims that this focus forms a
part of a much larger concern:
if we can decide how our food needs are met, we should be able to decide the
rules. If we can’t decide the rules, we’re not going to have those food exchanges.
So, we have to have access to the decision-making…it’s really not about
regulations—it’s about who is making those decisions. You cannot get out [of the
system] what you’re not allowed to put in.
This concern for the process of decision making draws attention to the legislative
mechanisms at work behind regulation. Helen showed awareness of this when she referred to the
regulatory framework as a “labyrinth.” After going to the state house in Augusta to testify for the
first time regarding regulatory exemptions of small-scale poultry production, she reflects on how
the focus of her advocacy shifted from “scale-appropriate regulation” to the democratic process
itself. Agencies and regulators jeopardize this process by “telling the legislators what they can
and can’t do” and, as a result, “the people are left out of it entirely.”
As “a form of resistance” to unfair regulation, Helen describes food sovereignty as a way
of reclaiming authority within their hometown. It serves as a way “to opt-out” of the current rulemaking process in preference for “engaging and participating in democracy at a level that we can
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actually access the democracy.” The ability to access the decision-making process is a base-line
expectation of food sovereignty not being met at this point in time.
The decision-making process represents the primary field of struggle for community
members, as the administrative structure of government has ceded control to “extragovernmental decision panels that decide inside closed doors and with highly specialized
attorneys.”407 Harold laments this loss of common access as a diminishing of the civic or public
sphere, a loss of the ability to collectively deliberate as to how to live in the world. Analogizing
public decision-making around food to that of energy policy, he emphasizes that “energy policy
is for the whole community, and the whole community is you and me and the technical people in
energy.” In other words, systemic issues such as energy generation and use or food production
and distribution require input from everyone because the results have too much influence to be
left to the experts who may gloss over community nuance and differences.
Focusing on this structural deficiency of access to the regulatory decision-making process
contributes to a larger argument by Harold that advocates for community self-governance. As a
“democratic argument,” this form of governance aims for “what is best for different reasons and
different purposes in different parts of the community.” It fragments the decision-making process
in order to account for local nuance and to build trust amongst members. In other words, it seeks
to build social norms in such a way that reflects the values of communities that feel threatened
by corporate consolidation of agricultural practices. Over time, these norms serve as effective
mechanisms of regulation in themselves, but rather than regulate the idiosyncratic practices of
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small-scale farms, they would regulate and define as ‘abnormal’ the industrial, disconnected
modes of food production.408
In calling for the rule-making process to occur at the smallest unit of government possible
in the state—the municipality—the legal maneuver can presumably account for the built-in
affective connections of town politics and the relationships that exist there.409 Towns enacting
resistant legislation serve to localize the legitimation process that otherwise functions as a form
of “contract oppression,” where legitimacy emerges only through adherence to the strict schema
of a legal system that privileges high production and standardized practices.410
By legally recognizing the localized practices of farming, food sovereignty affirms and
privileges a discursive landscape formed by contingency and difference, rather than any uniform
discipline. Furthermore, affirming the differences between farmers strengthens the locality’s
ability to articulate when they experience relations of domination; the municipal ordinances
fragment regulatory impact and afford more flexibility at the town level while exposing the
homogenous rigidity of the state’s regulatory apparatus.
Such fragmentation of the decision-making process, however, does not discount the
individual’s ability to decide, but rather amplifies the resonance of decisions each person makes
because of a more tightly-woven community ethos. From a public goods management
perspective, such amplification through shared norms “reduce[s] the cost of monitoring and
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sanctioning activities” and generates a form of “social capital.”411 For example, in response to
the concern that food sovereignty ordinances would imperil consumers with an increased risk
food-borne illness, Harold responds:
[If] you’re marketing your product where the buyer does not know, or even
perhaps care, where it came from, then you have to create a structure which
guarantees to the public that everything reasonable has been done…to guarantee
public safety. But if you have direct interaction between producers and
consumers, or processors and consumers, within a support structure [composed]
of the connections between community members, I think other principles of food
safety can be brought to bear. It’s up to me. It’s important to keep those kinds of
things alive because otherwise what we’d get is a totally regulated top-to-bottom
[food system]
The ‘social capital’ that Harold describes in this passage operates as a sort of “lex insita,” or the
law or principle undergirding “the immanent regularities of the social world.”412 Public goods
management generates social capital, or the affective relations that materialize in the
‘constitutive’ rhetorical texts of food sovereignty’s discourse.
Social capital has inertia. It accumulates through the value communities invest in
common things like traditions and law. Food sovereignty seeks to re-articulate agrarian values at
the municipal level to the extent that they gain enough momentum (through the passage of
municipal ordinances, for example) to have these values and practices recognized at the state
level. The impact of such inertia appears in the testimony offered by actors who are not directly
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connected to the communities who have passed municipal ordinances, such as non-profit
organizations and engaged academics.
Food sovereignty’s discourse resonates beyond the sphere of food production into the
wider spheres of social organization that conceive of “consumer education [as] a public good”413
to the extent that informed decisions about what food one feeds their family leads to general
public welfare and the prevention of food-borne illness. Likewise, the discourse of food
sovereignty in Maine draws the attention of scholars studying how social relationships that
cultivate and maintain subjugated knowledges are inevitably connected to the regulatory and
infrastructural constraints of industrial food production.414
Alan, the state legislator, uses the metaphor of “moving” in a positive direction regarding
food sovereignty legislation at the state level. He suggests that, as momentum accelerates
through more towns passing the ordinance, more representatives will have to recognize “the will
of the people through their local ordinance decision-making.” By emphasizing this, Alan nods
not only to the grassroots-level organizing that fuels the advocacy, but also to the process of
gaining legitimacy in the eyes of political representatives. Through the publicizing and
multiplying of local decision-making in the form of ordinances, ‘the will of the people’ “gains
respectability.”
Such gains shift the discursive field of state politics in ways that expose ‘status quo’
political rhetoric as out-of-touch or even deliberately misleading. As an example, Alan points to
the “bizarre” and “irrational court decisions” that occurred in Maine v. Brown. Even though the
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farmer was selling raw milk from his farm and at a farmers market in a town that had passed an
ordinance,
the judge said that the people of the town of Blue Hill did not intend to include
meat and dairy when they passed the ordinance…it’s very bizarre for a court to
presume what the people meant when they pass an ordinance. That’s outside of
the normal practice of jurisprudence.
This decision, along with “an equally bizarre ruling” by the Maine Supreme Court, was made
because the ordinances use specific language from the state constitution in defending their rights
to produce, process, sell, and consume foods of their choice. The court decisions stretch the
limits of interpretation because they do not want to wade into the “constitutional nightmare” of
challenging home rule, or the investment of authority into municipal governments.
Home rule constitutes a point of pride for Maine culture, or the independent spirit that
other interviewees comment upon. I include a lengthy passage from Alan to illustrate both how
the court rulings stretch interpretive limits and how comparisons are frequently made between
the face-to-face transactions of food products and community social events where food is also
often sold:
the Supreme Court…made an equally bizarre ruling that the ordinance, when it
said that goods could be purchased without regulation, they said that that means
local regulation, that that means regulations from the town of Blue Hill and it
does not mean state regulations. Well, there are no regulations at the town level,
so nobody ever thought to put the word ‘state’ before the word ‘regulations’ in the
ordinance to clarify that they meant state regulations. Of course they meant state
regulations! ...The reason for these bizarre court decisions, in my opinion, is
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because it gets at a very fundamental constitutional issue in the state of Maine,
which is called the home rule provision in the constitution. And no court really
wants to dig into that constitutional nightmare…Home rule is regarded as a high
priority in the way laws are interpreted in the state…
If the court rules against home rule, it would negate a strong tradition of local influence;
if the state rules in favor, then it might “open up the floodgates.” ‘Floodgates’ metaphorically
refers to the regulatory structure that governs commerce at the municipal level in the state and
that a slippery slope situation may arise at any level of regulatory leniency. In opposition to this
position, Alan suggests that a ruling one way or another on home rule would necessarily
compromise the “state of limbo over the home rule question” that has become the de facto legal
status in Maine.
Food sovereignty applies counter-pressure against the regulatory structure by pushing the
state on the question of home rule. Such counter-pressure functions in a tactical way, where
actions have their greatest effect in undefined spaces and at times most advantageous to the
community under pressure.415 With this court ruling, a new avenue of tactical possibilities
presents itself for advocates. By appropriating the home rule clause from the Maine constitution
into the ordinance, food sovereignty advocates make “a calculated action determined by the
absence of a proper locus,”416 or a definitive regulatory stance towards home rule and how it
affects food.
In Maine, this ‘state of limbo’ enables the growth and maintenance of a “historical
culture…of community members coming together and holding church suppers” among other
community social events. These events are unquestionably culturally appropriate. As Alan puts
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it, “nobody’s going to try to prosecute the church ladies for putting on a church supper…that’s
politically and culturally just unacceptable.” Food sovereignty seeks to make comparisons
between these types of events and the food distribution system as a rhetorical tactic to strengthen
their argument and heighten its emotional appeal. Attempts to do so appeal to those common
things that “we agree on by the way we live our lives” and which nobody would rightfully
question because of our unspoken rules of propriety.
We spin our cultural web through tacit agreements that serve as public nodes of affective
connection. By making explicit the comparison between church suppers (or similar events) and
the face-to-face exchange of food, food sovereignty actively searches for those sites of affection.
At the legislative level, these sites serve as touchstones for cooperating without consensus. Alan
acknowledges as much by speaking to the bipartisan appeal of food sovereignty legislation.
While “republicans may focus more on eliminating governmental control and promoting
individual rights,” “democrats are probably thinking of it more along the lines of communitybuilding [and] strengthening local economies.” Although these ways of thinking may not
coincide, both sets of political persuasions seek to create the conditions for affect—namely,
maintaining the tension between the individual and community.
Appeal of Food Sovereignty or Combinatory/Syntagmatic Logic
The tactical rhetoric of food sovereignty in Maine, as noted earlier, uses metaphor in
response to the metonymic reduction of its values by the disciplinary discourse of industrial food
production, but can slip into metonymy as well when using ‘constitutive’ rhetoric.417 It defines
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itself and its values as subjugated to the discursive “relations of oppression”418 that corporate
farming create, yet needs these relations to articulate its own capacity for hegemony. By paying
attention to rhetorical devices at play in the discourse, I try to foresee how food sovereignty can
actualize it potential for hegemony, or how it may ‘become hegemonic.’419
This necessarily looks at the current moment in time to judge the effectiveness of food
sovereignty’s discourse. In terms of applying pressure, the political moment of popular anger
towards ‘elites’ in general and bureaucracy more specifically lends a sense of urgency to efforts
that look to subvert established relations of power or at least to divert the power so that it is more
widely shared.
Such a rhetorical mapping follows the ways food sovereignty appeals to a wide array of
people, as the widespread symbolic influence implicit in any reference to hegemony finds its
substance in ‘equivalential logic,’420 or in the capacity to identify with a common cause. Many
find common cause in ‘food’ as a political frame, which has a lot of purchase in the current
political landscape. Again, the tactical deftness of food sovereignty comes to the fore, as the
increasing cultural influence of local food systems creates an opportunity for advocates to take
advantage of. Bea identifies the ‘frame’ of food as “sexy” in terms of how it attracts political
attention at this point in time.
Specifically, she refers to how the politicization of the food system unites political
factions that may traditionally oppose one another. In articulating how food makes an effective
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form of political framing, Bea ties in food sovereignty with populist sentiment and the current
political culture that many have characterized as ‘populist.’
When I go to talk about [food sovereignty]…half the room is libertarian…it is a
big circle. You eventually come around to realizing that…when the hippies and
rednecks realize that they’re both getting screwed by the same people, then the
revolution will happen. And on this particular issue, the hippies and the rednecks
have found common ground.
The widespread political appeal of food taps into popular notions of independence, liberty, and
sovereignty. Additionally, this appeal finds its grounding in the physical realities of daily life in
small farming communities. For example, Bea explains that:
the food sovereignty movement fits very comfortably into [populist discourse]
because it is the little guys defending themselves against being told what they can
grow and what they can eat and how they can sell it to people. That is why the
GMA is our enemy—because they don’t want people to know that they can grow
their own food. They don’t want people to know that they can go down the road
and buy eggs from their neighbor.
This quote points out the physical entanglements that the regulatory structure interferes
with as the basis for popular resentment. Such a perspective echoes the fundamentally
“embodied” quality of both democracy and populism. As a ‘political logic’ that is always latent
in any institutionalized form of society,421 populism forms along the affective connections we

Laclau, Reason, 117. I want to stress that ‘populism,’ as I talk about it here, is not a pejorative in the least. It is
conceived as a potent form of political logic that does not fall under the aegis of the ‘left’ or the ‘right.’ My goal in
articulating the populist character of food sovereignty is to suggest that, as a political discourse, it has potential to
undermine and erode the hegemonic status that industrial food production has at the state level. Namely, advocating
for farming rights and rights to food contribute to “rethink[ing] the ecological conditions and scale at which human
communities can live, and survive.” In this way, the ‘populism’ of food sovereignty in Maine underlies “an active,
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have with one another. Food sovereignty is, above all, an embodied set of demands. Embodiment
not only focuses more attention on the affective dimension of discourse than the rational
dimension, it also erodes the belief in a transcendental and hierarchical law governing all forms
of social organization. As embodied demands, food sovereignty emphasizes the temporally
“plastic continuity” of democracy, or the ways meaning fluctuates through time between and “is
embodied in various representations, images, and metaphors.”422
In the attempt to preserve ‘traditional foodways,’ the ordinance speaks directly to the
practices that define these traditions—local production and distribution of raw milk, home
slaughter of meat, and bartering of goods with one’s neighbors. The industrial regulatory
schema—as referenced by food sovereignty—directly impacts the embodied meaning of smallscale food production. It is bio-political and exerts bio-power.
Bea compellingly draws this definition to include the wider community in describing
food as a political ‘frame’:
food freedom is like mom’s family says; growing your own food is like printing
your own money and, fortunately, growing your own food is still legal. It is a way
for the people, for a popular movement, to take back their power.
Within this wider community falls the ‘consumer,’ who has leverage in resisting the structural
bias against small-scale farmers. In Maine, Bea attributes to the consumer a role of protection.
Farmers grow the food, but without the local markets in which to sell their products, the impetus
behind food sovereingty would dissipate:

anti-systemic struggle.” See Philip McMichael, “Historicizing food sovereignty,” The Journal of Peasant Studies,
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422
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the protection comes from the consumer side, more than from the farmer side
because you have consumers who are educated and aware and paying
attention…they are making much more conscious decisions about where their
food dollars are going. That is the protection, because those folks are pretty hard
to bamboozle and they are pretty hard—greenwashing does not work with them.
They see right through it.
Using food as a discursive frame allows for a wider identification with food sovereignty
and grounds the demands in the physical realm. Although vague, this very vagueness of food
accounts for its resonance, such that ‘food’ for farmers can refer to the processes and means of
production whereas for consumers ‘food’ can refer to the culinary and intimate acts of enjoyment
and satisfaction within the home. Regardless of the perspective, the frame attaches the audience
to a place. Thus, it has ‘substance’ in a Burkean sense, yet remains symbolic in its attraction.
‘Food,’ in this sense, becomes a “commonplace.”423 Considering it as such takes into
consideration the practices that constitute food itself. Jeff does this in discussing the “paradigm
shift” needed in terms of agricultural methods of production towards a more distributed model.
Using a metaphor of “inoculation,” Jeff articulates the tactical ethos of food sovereignty by
saying that “you work within the regulatory framework.” This perspective of growth from within
seeks to undermine and eventually transform the system to produce different sets of assumptions.
At the moment, the corporate regulatory system “presupposes destruction…it assumes that any

The “commonplace” of food, here, refers to its capacity as a site of material and symbolic worth “that mobilizes
those who identify with it to make substantive changes on its behalf.” See Caroline Gottschalk Druschke,
“Watershed as Common-Place: Communicating for Conservation at the Watershed Scale,” Environmental
Communication 7, 1 (2013): 80-96. Such a ‘commonplace’ is but one of many within the larger discourse of food
sovereignty. The ways food can operate within this discourse—as ‘sexy’ political bait, the product of a community’s
collective labor, and the object of state regulatory power—make it more than a commodity; food as commonplace
manifests in the “enactments of the dynamics that generate discourse.” See Nathan Stormer. “Looking in Wonder:
Prenatal Sublimity and the Commonplace Life,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 33, 3 (2008): 648.
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human activity on the planet is inherently destructive, and so we must regulate our destruction
and regulate our animal urges.”
Distinguishing between the regulatory system and the ‘animal’ instincts it seeks to
control echoes the dualism found in rhetorical traditions dating back to Plato and Aristotle. In
antiquity, philosophers found the sociability of humans to present a limitation on our capacity to
develop wisdom. Thus, philosophers (lovers of wisdom) sought separation from the realm of
necessity (the home) – where labor and needs were satisfied through force – in the public realm,
the realm of politics. Jeff advocates for a very different conception of the political here, one that
accounts for the “emergence of society” as Hannah Arendt terms it.424 Assumptions about human
capacity need to change along ecological fault lines and recognize “humans as a keystone species
on this planet.” It is not that we inherently destroy the world around us, but that we change it in
fundamental ways:
Our actions on ecosystems affect the well-being of all other organisms in that
ecosystem. We are a keystone species, whether or not we choose to accept that
responsibility. Right now, as Americans, we have this exceptionalism. Like, we
are not going to take responsibility! … Humans can be beneficial, a force of good
on this planet.425
Focusing on the means of production in food sovereignty as a practice have appeal across
a wide range of political viewpoints. There is a liberal impulse to adhere to law, but a
deregulatory impulse as well to protect small-scale growers from over-burdensome regulation.
Indeed, Jeff frames this appeal in that the ordinance has “always been about enshrining the de
facto status quo into local, municipal ordinance law.” Transforming the de facto into the de jure
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because of a perceived threat relies on the commitment to a distributed model of food
production.
In practice, this means that communities recognize how “the working rules used by
appropriators” (i.e. small-scale farmers) do not have a singular or common source, but rather
they should depend upon the dynamics that condition farming at the municipal level.426 The selfgovernance advocated by food sovereignty affirms that agrarian practices emerge in situ as
opposed to being vertically imposed within a hierarchy. This endemic horizontality of
agrarianism guides the political logic that leads to its codification at the municipal level in vague
language. Jeff takes this in an ecological direction with resilience in mind, but other advocates
take it to mean a sort of resilient community ethos in terms of traditions and values. Of course,
ecology and value systems are intimately connected, but the shifts in emphasis speak to the
widespread appeal or ‘combinatory’ logic of food sovereignty.
This logic is at work in Nicholas’ commentary regarding the political attraction of the
ordinance. Besides increasing a community’s capacity for resilience in the face of dramatic
change by altering modes of food production, the assertion of local control also allows for
changing public perception of how we make sense of the world we live in. Playing on the
common trope of ‘independence,’ Nicholas suggests that food sovereignty should make the case
that the ordinance “would be a victory for individual liberty as well as sustainability.” He
acknowledges that the ordinance has widespread appeal because of its ability to speak into
different political discourses.
These discourses may seem at odds, but the ordinance has thus far straddled the
discourses by focusing on the common-ness of our food system. Regardless of whether or not

426

Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 55.

136

one has “philosophical reservations” about the intent of the ordinance to exert local control, it is
“something that should be publicly discussed.” Perhaps this simple insight can help to explain
the appeal of the discourse.
In a time of toxic political discourse, food sovereignty offers opportunities to address
commonly-held values and to look critically at the system of food production that we all partake
in. Similar to Bourdieu’s concept of lex insita, Nicholas’ comments point to the potency of a
form of self-governance known as “vernacular law.”427
Vernacular law emerges from the “unofficial zones of society and is a source of moral
legitimacy and power in its own right.”428 In practice, it looks much like the municipal
ordinances passed by communities in Maine, with its primary characteristic that of distributed
governance derived from social practice and tradition. Distributed governance enables
communities to respond to particular needs arising in their localities, but does not seek to upend
the rule of law. Indeed, vernacular law makes a compelling case to widen the range of the
‘Public Trust Doctrine,’ or the means of state power to declare certain things—like a lakeshore,
forest, or a ‘foodshed’—as commonly owned.429
By enabling this common focus, the ordinance opens up opportunities for affective
exchange, or interactions that allow members of the community to think through how our modes
of food production and consumption influence how we interact more broadly in terms of trust
and ‘togetherness.’ Such reflection leads Nicholas to provide a fruitful juxtaposition between the
industrial regulatory environment and its local counterpart—a comparison that attends to the
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discursive absurdities that underlie the principle counter-argument against food sovereignty ‘food safety:’
to say with a straight face that it’s more dangerous to look your farmer in the eye
and buy some food produced a mile down the road from them than buying
packaged, processed, preservative-laden, sugar and salt-filled food that did pass
muster by the FDA—put it in that light and it doesn’t make sense to me.
Such realism should be cultivated in the sense of combining it with the existing industrial
system. Akin to the flawed thinking of industrial food production that constructs food-borne
illness as a ‘disorder,’ food sovereignty should not discursively construct industrial food
production as ‘the problem’ without qualification. In other words, there should be attention paid
to defining the problem and focusing on the nuances.
Laclau’s discussion on combinatory or equivalential logic helps work through such an
approach. Indeed, I think that food sovereignty’s discourse already adopts a syntagmatic tactical
rhetoric. For example, Renee and other advocates combine concerns for environmental
protection with the need for economic security and preservation of tradition: “It’s a combination
of arguments—environmental arguments, tradition arguments, [and] economic arguments.”
Rather than articulating food sovereignty discourse as a paradigmatic shift or ‘battle’ against the
dominant system, syntagmatic discourse uses what arguments have been sustained by this very
system to strengthen its own case for change.
Such an approach enables one to draw systemic connections between the aspirations of
localized and deregulated food systems and the sense that ‘this is how we have always been.’
With such combination, a wider audience can identify than only those who may have found a
specific argument appealing. Affective appeal—the ways in which ‘we’ sustain ourselves—helps
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to lubricate the political friction between groups identifying as oppositional in the past, notably
between groups that advocate for economic progress as opposed to those who advocate for
environmental protection.
Conclusions: Inoculation via the Vernacular
Jeff’s metaphor of ‘inoculation’ provides an appropriate way to conclude this analysis.
By inoculating the disciplinary discourse of industrial food production with the affective
relationships and face-to-face economics of food sovereignty, this subjugated discourse effects a
parasitic yet fruitful change to the rhetorical landscape of food systems thinking. To extend this
metaphor, I suggest that such inoculation serves as a precursor to a mycelial network of
vernacular values430 and the maintenance of agrarian traditions as a means to further socioecological resilience through vernacular law.
Invoking a metaphor of mycelium points to the “subtle, yet intentional network of ideas
and values” that compose the food sovereignty discourse.431 Furthermore, mycelial bodies form
dense meshworks that feed off the rigid structures surrounding them; indeed, as a cultivator of
mushrooms, I know that the wider the diameter of a log, the longer I will be able to harvest
mushrooms, as the mycelia will have more lignin-rich substrate to feed off over time. There is
plenty of rigid industrial substrata for food sovereignty to grow upon and fruit off.
Similarly, to conceive of food sovereignty as a mycelial network focuses on the various
practices composing its discourse. In this sense, Stengers’ perspective of an “ecology of
practices”432 as the basis of diplomacy offers a fruitful place to end. An ‘ecology of practices’
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focuses critique on the relations between institutionalized practices (e.g. law or medicine) and
“empowered minorities who have become collectively able to object, question, and impose”
otherwise neglected ways of knowing.433
The grassroots diplomacy of food sovereignty practices the syntagmatic logic that an
ecology of practices requires. Rather than demanding deregulation of agricultural production, it
advocates for exemption from licensure and inspection in order for small-scale farmers to exist.
Recognizing nuance in this way speaks to the importance of belonging and how it differs from
identity.
Namely, belonging points to the social obligations that constitute the affective relations
fundamental to food sovereignty; identity points to a fixed set of rules or norms that would
effectively negate the legislative goals of the ordinances to recognize and pluralize authority at
the municipal level. Obligations act as limits to the ‘juridical’ excesses of the corporate-state.
They “entail that a new practical ethos…is a creation, not a change.”434 The invention of food
sovereignty’s discourse draws distinctions between the habits of small-scale farming and the
rules that the state seeks to enforce. These agrarian practices, the ethos of food sovereignty,
cannot be separated or displaced from their respective places without losing their character and
their potential for radically changing the ways we institute our social selves.
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CONCLUSION
Food sovereignty both uses and develops what Isabelle Stengers’ calls “tools for
thinking.”435 Whether invoking home rule as the basis of municipal authority or crafting
ordinances that pass unanimously at town meeting, advocates understand how these tools
enhance their ability to actualize power for a particular purpose. Tools for thinking compel us to
make and deploy poetic ‘terministic screens’436—they tell us what should happen, how we
should direct our capacities. They lie in distinction to “scientistic”437 screens that describe what
is and is not, or how to interpret questions of fact. Under scientistic screens, however, questions
of fact transform into statements of truth that develop into a discourse of belief, or poetic terms
that dictate what should happen. Coupled with power, such a discourse de-legitimizes nonbelievers as a means to maintain control.
This study argues that industrial food production operates through such a discourse and
de-legitimizes small-scale agricultural practices in the process. Food sovereignty advocates for
the legitimacy of those whose ways of living under a globalized, industrial regulatory system are
defined as ‘disorderly’ or dangerous to public health. These definitions emerge from a discursive
construction that emphasizes standardization, mechanization, and commodification of
agricultural practices.
More specifically, I argue that the discourse of food sovereignty moves beyond a simple
critique of industrial food systems and begins the work of worldly composition out of what
remains of the rural traditions in Maine. Not only is this work hopeful, it is also pragmatic in that
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it requires us to think about the nuances of everyday life. Such discernment troubles factual
discourses when the ‘facts’ fail to accommodate idiosyncratic patterns of experience.
I do not mean to suggest that food sovereignty peddles in ‘alternative facts,’ or any other
disingenuous euphemism that describes an abuse of power and open deceit. Rather, I point to the
prescient observations of Latour when he observed in 2010 that “facts have become issues,”438
when scientific discourses fail to acknowledge the disputability of their claims to truth. Such a
failure emerges from the ‘reductionism’ of expertise—of highly-trained and hyper-specialized
skillsets that are then deployed through power structures whose effects manifest in places like
rural Maine.
The pragmatism of food sovereignty disobeys “the power of some more general
reason,”439 opting instead for the obligatory attachments that foster a sense of belonging to
community. ‘Grassroots diplomacy’ grows from this particular belonging and does not need to
agree with the industrial discourse to have its desired effect of gaining legitimacy. As Stengers
emphasizes, diplomacy actually depends on an acceptance of disagreement on the part of
diplomats.
Differing practices should complement each other in their weaknesses rather than seeking
compliance to a ‘stronger’ point of view or ‘better’ pattern of experience. As a “social
technology,”440 grassroots diplomacy relies on the creative impulses that I have outlined as
fundamental to the vernacular basis of food sovereignty for their legal and cultural ‘innovation.’
From this perspective, heterogeneous agrarian values and ecological methods of food production
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have as much currency and validity as the homogeneous values and standardized production of
industrial agriculture.441
Food sovereignty gathers small-scale farmers, local consumers, and legislators in Maine
together to explore what can happen when a community allows for constrained practices to
“unfold their own force.”442 Such an unfolding holds potential for resilience and cultural renewal
in the face of an unpredictable and worrying future. The compositional force of food sovereignty
shifts the epistemic spaces of our culture away from the laboratory and courtroom into the fields
and forests of rural Maine.443 We need to know ourselves and our homes before we can share
these in common with others.
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APPENDIX B:
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Project Title: Rhetoric of Food Sovereignty in Maine
You are invited to participate in a research project that is part of my study as a graduate student
in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Maine. The purpose of
the research is to understand the rhetoric of Maine’s food sovereignty movement. Dr. Bridie
McGreavy, Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication and Journalism, is my
faculty sponsor for this project. You must be at least 18 years of age to participate.
What Will You Be Asked to Do?
You will be asked to participate in an interview that will ask you about your experiences in the
food sovereignty movement. If you decide to participate, I will ask you questions about your
experience related to farming or local food systems in Maine and the influence that agricultural
practices have on your participation in the food sovereignty movement. Questions include: How
did your involvement in the food sovereignty movement in Maine begin? In your opinion, does
food sovereignty, as a concept, align with certain agricultural practices more than others? What
does using rights-based language to describe food sovereignty do that other forms of language
cannot do?
The interviews will be audio recorded. Interviews will take between 30 minutes to 2 hours of
your time.
Risks
Except for your time and inconvenience, there are no risks to you from participating in this
study.
Benefits
Although the project will not benefit you directly, the research expects to contribute to a better
understanding of Maine’s local food system, its community dynamics, and its influence on state
policy.
Confidentiality
If given permission, I will audiotape the interview. If I use any quotations in publications your
name will not be connected to those statements. This interview will last anywhere from 30
minutes to 2 hours, depending on what topics you would like to cover.
Care will be taken to protect the confidentiality of the interview. Your name or other identifying
information will not be reported in any publications. Your name will be removed from notes and
replaced with an identifier. The key linking your name to the identifier will be written in a
notebook that will remain in in John Welton’s locked office. Only John Welton will have access
to the notes, which will be stored on a password protected computer. Hardcopies will be stored in
a locked office. All recordings will be kept on John Welton’s password protected computer until
the completion of the project. After the project is completed the key notes, and all recordings
from the interviews will be deleted from John Welton’s computer and all hardcopies will be
destroyed when done with the project, expected to be on or before May 2017.
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Voluntary
Your participation is completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any point. You are
always free to stop the interview or not answer the question.
Contact Information
If you have any questions about this study, please contact John Welton at 402 Dunn Hall;
john.welton@maine.edu. Dr. Bridie Mcgreavy, my faculty sponsor, can be reached at
bridie.mcgreavy@maine.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research
participant, please contact Gayle Jones, Assistant to the University of Maine’s Protection of
Human Subjects Review Board, at 581-1498 (or e-mail gayle.jones@umit.maine.edu
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APPENDIX C:
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. I appreciate your willingness to contribute
your thoughts to this research. This interview is part of a Master’s thesis project focused on the
food sovereignty movement in Maine. My intent is to better understand how the movement’s
rhetoric develops from the material conditions (e.g., agricultural practices) of its advocates.
Questions
Are you a farmer? If so, how long have you been a farmer, and how did you become a farmer?
Please describe your approach to agriculture. For example, do you follow any specific methods
of production? Why do you follow these instead of other ways to produce food?
Do your agricultural practices inform your perspective of the food sovereignty movement, or do
you see these as separate parts of your life?
Is there any one on-farm task or activity that you see as directly linked to food sovereignty as a
concept? How do you make sense of food sovereignty in terms of the everyday work that occurs
on the farm?
What has been the extent of your involvement in the food sovereignty movement in Maine?
Do you know the history of the food sovereignty movement elsewhere, not only in Maine? How
do you see Maine’s movement connected to the historical movements of food sovereignty
elsewhere? What is similar? What is different?
In your opinion, how is agriculture as practiced in a ‘food sovereign’ place, as understood in
your town’s rights-based ordinance, different than agriculture practiced in a conventional (i.e. in
places without any passed ordinances) place?
What parts of an agricultural lifestyle does food sovereignty affect the most? How does this
movement and its focus on rights impact non-farmers?
As of summer 2016, seventeen towns in Maine have passed rights-based ordinances related to
food sovereignty. As a participant in the movement, what do you see as the future of food
sovereignty in Maine? Is there a “goal” for the movement in Maine?
Is there anyone else you think I should talk to regarding the food sovereignty movement in
Maine?
Is there anything you would want to offer this conversation that I did not ask about?
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APPENDIX D:
LOCAL FOOD AND COMMUNITY SELF-GOVERNANCE ORDINANCE OF 2014
AN ORDINANCE TO PROTECT THE HEALTH AND INTEGRITY OF THE LOCAL
FOOD SYSTEM IN THE TOWN OF (NAME OF TOWN) , (NAME OF COUNTY)
COUNTY, MAINE.
Section 1. Name. This Ordinance shall be known and may be cited as the “Local Food and
Community Self-Governance Ordinance.”
Section 2. Definitions.
As used in this ordinance:
(a) “Patron” means an individual who is the last person to purchase any product or
preparation
directly from a processor or producer and who does not resell the product or preparation.
(b) “Home consumption” means consumed within a private home.
(c) “Local Foods” means any food or food product that is grown, produced, or processed
by individuals who sell directly to their patrons through farm-based sales or buying clubs,
at farmers markets, roadside stands, fundraisers or at community social events.
(d) “Processor” means any individual who processes or prepares products of the soil or
animals for food or drink.
(e) “Producer” means any farmer or gardener who grows any plant or animal for food
or drink.
(f) “Community social event” means an event where people gather as part of a
community for the benefit of those gathering, or for the community, including but not
limited to a church or religious social, school event, potluck, neighborhood gathering,
library meeting, traveling food sale, fundraiser, craft fair, farmers market and other public
events.
Section 3. Preamble and Purpose. We the People of the Town of (name of town), (name of
county) County, Maine have the right to produce, process, sell, purchase and consume local
foods thus promoting self-reliance, the preservation of family farms, and local food traditions.
We recognize that family farms, sustainable agricultural practices, and food processing by
individuals, families and non-corporate entities offers stability to our rural way of life by
enhancing the economic, environmental and social wealth of our community. As such, our right
to a local food system requires us to assert our inherent right to self-government. We recognize
the authority to protect that right as belonging to the Town of (name of town).
We have faith in our citizens’ ability to educate themselves and make informed decisions. We
hold that federal and state regulations impede local food production and constitute an usurpation
of our citizens’ right to foods of their choice. We support food that fundamentally respects
human dignity and health, nourishes individuals and the community, and sustains producers,
processors and the environment. We are therefore duty bound under the Constitution of the State
of Maine to protect and promote unimpeded access to local foods.
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The purpose of the Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance is to:
(i) Provide citizens with unimpeded access to local food;
(ii) Enhance the local economy by promoting the production and purchase of local
agricultural products;
(iii) Protect access to farmers’ markets, roadside stands, farm based sales and direct
producer to patron sales;
(iv) Support the economic viability of local food producers and processors;
(v) Preserve community social events where local foods are served or sold;
(vi) Preserve local knowledge and traditional foodways.
Section 4. Authority. This Ordinance is adopted and enacted pursuant to the inherent,
inalienable, and fundamental right of the citizens of the Town of (name of town) to selfgovernment, and under the authority recognized as belonging to the people of the Town by all
relevant state and federal laws including, but not limited to the following:
The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America, which declares
that governments are instituted to secure peoples’ rights, and that government
derives its just powers from the consent of the governed.
Article I, § 2 of the Maine Constitution, which declares: “all power is inherent in
the people; all free governments are founded in their authority and instituted for
their benefit, [and that] they have therefore an unalienable and indefeasible right
to institute government and to alter, reform, or totally change the same when their
safety and happiness require it.”
§3001 of Title 30-A of the Maine Revised Statutes, which grants municipalities
all powers necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the residents of
the Town of (name of town).
§1-A of Title 7 of the Maine Revised Statutes which states: “The survival of the
family farm is of special concern to the people of the State, and the ability
of the family farm to prosper, while producing an abundance of high
quality food and fiber, deserves a place of high priority in the
determination of public policy.”
§ 1-B of Title 7 of the Maine Revised Statutes which states: “...The preservation
of rural life and values in the State {is}the joint responsibility of all public
agencies, local, state and federal, whose policies and programs
substantially impact the economy and general welfare of people who
reside in rural Maine, such as the development and implementation of
programs that assist in the maintenance of family farms{...}, and improve
health and nutrition. The state agencies in addition to the department
include, but are not limited to, the Department of Education, Department
of Health and Human Services, Department of Labor and the Department
of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry.
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§201-A of Title 7-A of the Maine Revised Statutes which states: “It is the policy
of the State to encourage food self-sufficiency for its citizens. The
department (Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry) shall
support policies that:
1. Local Control. Through local control preserve the abilities of
communities to produce, process, sell, purchase, and consume
locally produced foods.
(…)
3. Improved Health and Well-Being. Improve the health and wellbeing of citizens of this State by reducing hunger and increasing
food security through improved access to wholesome, nutritious
foods by supporting family farms and encouraging sustainable
farming and fishing;
4. Self-reliance and personal responsibility. Promote self-reliance
and personal responsibility by ensuring the ability of individuals,
families and other entities to prepare, process, advertise and sell
foods directly to customers intended solely for consumption by the
customers or their families.
(...)
Section 5. Statements of Law.
Section 5.1. Licensure/Inspection Exemption. Producers or processors of local
foods in the Town of (name of town) are exempt from licensure and inspection
provided that the transaction is only between the producer or processor and a
patron when the food is sold for home consumption. This includes any producer
or processor who sells his or her products at farmers’ markets or roadside stands;
sells his or her products through farm-based sales directly to a patron; or delivers
his or her products directly to patrons.
Section 5.1.a. Licensure/Inspection Exemption. Producers or processors of
local foods in the Town of (name of town) are exempt from licensure and
inspection provided that their products are prepared for, consumed, or sold at a
community social event.
Section 5.2. Right to Access and Produce Food. (name of town) citizens possess
the right to save and exchange seed; produce, process, sell, purchase, and
consume local foods of their choosing.
Section 5.3. Right to Self-Governance. All citizens of (name of town) possess
the right to a form of governance which recognizes that all power is inherent in
the people, that all free governments are founded on the people’s authority and
consent.
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Section 5.4. Right to Enforce. (name of town) citizens possess the right to adopt
measures which prevent the violation of the rights enumerated in this Ordinance.
Section 6. Statement of Law. Implementation. The following restrictions and provisions serve
to implement the preceding statements of law.
Section 6.1. State and Federal Law. It shall be unlawful for any law or
regulation adopted by the state or federal government to interfere with the rights
recognized by this Ordinance. It shall be unlawful for any corporation to interfere
with the rights recognized by this Ordinance. The term “corporation” shall mean
any business entity organized under the laws of any state or country.
Section 6.2. Patron Liability Protection. Patrons purchasing food for home
consumption may enter into private agreements with those producers or
processors of local foods to waive any liability for the consumption of that food.
Producers or processors of local foods shall be exempt from licensure and
inspection requirements for that food as long as those agreements are in effect.
Section 7. Civil Enforcement. The Town of (name of town) may enforce the provisions of this
Ordinance through seeking equitable relief from a court of competent jurisdiction. Any
individual citizen of the Town of (name of town) shall have standing to vindicate any
rights secured by this ordinance which have been violated or which are threatened with
violation, and may seek relief both in the form of injunctive and compensatory relief from
a court of competent jurisdiction.
Section 8. Town Action against Pre-emption. The foundation for making and adoption of this
law is the peoples’ fundamental and inalienable right to govern themselves, and thereby secure
their rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Any attempt to use other units and levels
of government to preempt, amend, alter or overturn this Ordinance or parts of this Ordinance
shall require the Town to hold public meetings that explore the adoption of other measures that
expand local control and the ability of citizens to protect their fundamental and inalienable right
to self-government.
Section 9. Effect. This Ordinance shall be effective immediately upon its enactment.
Section 10. Severability Clause. To the extent any provision of this Ordinance is deemed
invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, such provision will be removed from the Ordinance,
and the balance of the Ordinance shall remain valid.
Section 11. Repealer. All inconsistent provisions of prior Ordinances adopted by the Town
of (name of town) are hereby repealed, but only to the extent necessary to remedy the
inconsistency.
Section 12. Human Rights and Constitutionality. Nothing in this ordinance shall be construed
as authorizing any activities or actions that violate human rights protected by the U.S.
Constitution or the Constitution of the State of Maine.
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